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Abstract 
 
This project is an investigation into medicine in action. The aim is to understand how 
medical interactions generate order via the diagnosis of disease; how the patient, the 
body, and illness are made intelligible, and how particular courses of action are decided 
upon as a result. Using video and audio data supplied by the Applied Research on 
Communication in Health (ARCH) research team, this project follows Simon, a middle 
aged, Caucasian male with chest pain, as he participates in consultations with his GP and 
cardiologist, and as he undergoes a cardio treadmill-stress test. 
 This project argues for adopting an Actor-Network theory (ANT) based 
approach to studying interactions. Unlike more traditional sociology approaches, this 
project considers the role of non-human objects in interaction. Non-human objects are 
often key actors in the interactions that provide the world with a sense of order. I will 
provide an epistemological justification for ANT’s key premises and outline the method 
that these premises entail. 
 Following three interactions, this project illustrates that the principal actors 
involved in producing intelligibility varies. In the GP consultation, the GP and Simon 
were principal actors in rendering chest pain intelligible. In the treadmill stress test, the 
material instrumentation, carefully aligned with the Simon’s body by the cardiologist, was 
vital to ensuring a particular account of the heart was produced. Simon was little more 
than a compliant body in this interaction. In the final interaction, the cardiologist was the 
principal actor in making sense of these accounts of chest pain and the potentially 
conflicting picture of the “healthy” heart. The cardiologist suggests that the account of 
the heart produced by the treadmill-stress test may be flawed, and encourages Simon to 
self-monitor and self-regulate. I will argue that the uncertainty generated by conflicting 
accounts is common to medical practices. Medical professionals respond to this by 
encouraging individuals to monitor and reduce risk. By adopting the ANT approach, I 
found that the patient and his body are sometimes intelligible as somatic entities, 
sometimes as an expressive, accounting agent, and sometimes as a self-responsible 
individual. These various renditions hold together as a being a single individual “Simon”. 
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Introduction  
 
 
Structural phenomena… are the emergent products of a vast amount of communicative, 
perceptual, judgmental, and other ‘accommodative’ work whereby persons, in concert 
and encountering ‘from within society’ the environments that the society confronts 
them with, establish, maintain, restore and alter the social structures that are the 
assembled products of the temporally extended courses of action directed to these 
environments as persons know them. (Garfinkel 1963: 187-8) 
 
 
Harold Garfinkel and his disciples viewed social order as being the accomplishment of 
everyday interactions between individuals. Rather than assuming that consensus and 
cohesion are imposed upon members by a collective body, social order, and indeed 
disorder, is seen as the product of the practical reasoning and practical actions of 
negotiating individuals. Through talk and action, individuals simultaneously make sense-
of, and compose, group activities. Society, then, is a product; it is the ongoing effect of 
the diverse interactions between individual agents. Accordingly, ethnomethodologists 
and ethnographers argue that if we wish to understand how society is ordered as it is, 
then we must observe these everyday, often mundane interactions. We must follow 
individuals as they make sense-of, and engage in, social activities. My project follows this 
key tenet. The intention of this thesis is to understand how the interactions that 
constitute medical practices generate order through the diagnosis of disease. By 
observing patients and medical professionals as they produce accounts of reality and 
negotiate these accounts, we will see how facts are discerned from non-facts, and thus 
how intelligibility is achieved.   
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 The medical interactions that we will be following are centered on one particular 
patient, referred to here as Simon. Simon is a middle-aged, Caucasian male who has been 
experiencing chest pain. He has an initial consultation with his GP and is referred to a 
cardiologist, who conducts a test aimed at determining the health of his heart, and then 
provides Simon with a diagnosis and some advice on maintaining a healthy lifestyle. 
These interactions have been captured on video and audio data by the Applied Research 
on Communication in Health research team (ARCH) based at the Wellington campus of 
the Otago School of Medicine. Using this data I will note how it is that, through these 
medical interactions, Simon and the other individuals involved are able to make sense-of 
their world and thus engage in particular courses of action. In other words, we will see 
exactly how it is that order is an achievement of such interactional practical reasoning 
and practical action.  
 
  
The advantage of ethnomethodology and ethnography based approaches is that they 
allows us to see the messiness of practices. As one commentator points out, rather than 
relying on official, clean, and prepared reports of the processes of fact-finding, discovery 
and diagnosis, these approaches allow the social researcher to witness the often untidy, 
contingent and diverse means by which knowledge is created (Law 2004: 18-19). 
Importantly, these methods therefore have the potential to reveal those many instances 
where a clear, definitive understanding of the world is not achieved; where interactions 
generate, and are centered upon, uncertainty and ambiguity. For this project, then, such 
an approach allows us to trace not only those circumstances in medical practice where a 
definite diagnosis is achieved, but also how indefinite, tentative diagnoses come about, 
and how these uncertainties are dealt with by the individuals themselves.  
 Where this project differs from traditional ethnomethodology and ethnography, 
however, is that I will not simply be focusing on the interactions between human actors. 
What I hope to demonstrate in the course of this thesis is that in the contemporary 
world, particularly in medical contexts, a great deal of the work done in accomplishing 
order and intelligibility is done by non-human objects. Here I will be employing Actor-
Network Theory (ANT), particularly the work of Bruno Latour and Annemarie Mol. 
While more traditional approaches stress that reality is culturally and historically located, 
ANT emphases that it is also materially located (Mol 1999: 75). Interactions between 
individuals often involve non-human objects whose material form can shape the 
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production of accounts and the understandings that result. Such objects are therefore 
vital in how people make sense-of their situation and the sort of activities they 
subsequently engage in. By using an ANT-based method, I will draw attention to the 
various ways that material objects shape the production of accounts and intelligibility in 
medical practices. This project, then, is not just an ethnography of interactions between 
humans and humans, but also humans and objects.  
 
This project is divided into two main parts. Part 1, The Metaphysics of ANT, is an 
epistemological justification for the ANT-based approach I am using. I will explain the 
theoretical basis for the central tenets of ANT, and illustrate how these tenets influence 
the methodology of the sociology that follows. Firstly, I will show that ANT is based on 
a conception of “social” that differs markedly from that which informs traditional 
sociological approaches. In the sense that we will be using the term, “social” is what 
happens when things associate, whether they be humans or non-humans, material or 
discursive. With this conception of the “social”, we cannot exclude material, non-human 
objects from sociological accounts. Secondly I will illustrate how ANT provides us with a 
different conception of scale.  By casting aside the traditional macro/micro division and 
focusing on the associations that form between both human and non-human entities, we 
will see that scale is a matter of connectedness: the more associated an entity is and the 
more connections it has with other elements, the more influential it is and the larger it 
seems.  Here I will employ DeLanda’s notion of emergence to demonstrate that with this 
notion of scale we can still conceive of “larger” order phenomena that cannot be reduced 
to their constituent parts. Consequently, social order and the production of accounts 
cannot necessarily be explained in terms of the actions of individuals. Using DeLanda’s 
notion of capacities for interaction, I will also show that it is through associations that entities 
become intelligible: as an entity interacts with another, some of its qualities become 
perceptible. It is therefore though such interactions, or assemblages, that individuals can 
make sense of their world.  Thirdly, I will illustrate that with this method we are led to a 
radical conception of the “actor”. Rather than an actor being the source of an action, it is 
a point where action is converted, or translated, into another type of action. Actors are 
made to act, to associate with entities, via other actors. They are not an a priori source of 
action, but instead the temporary product of an assemblage between actors. According to 
this definition, non-human entities have the ability to become actors.  
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 I will then go on to illustrate how this metaphysics leads us to a sociological 
method of “following the actors”.  If we wish to understand how it is that interactions 
generate understandings of the world, how it is that intelligibility is produced, then we 
must follow human and non-human objects as they associate to form assemblages. We 
must identify which entities, human or non-human, are inducing assemblages and are 
therefore actors, and must note how, through the resulting interactions, entities are 
endowed with form and thus become intelligible. Noting how some humans and non-
humans are prevented from becoming part of an assemblage will allow us to see how 
other potential forms of intelligibility are elided. If we are to follow a patient in a medical 
context then, we must note which entities they become associated with, such as medical 
professionals, medical instruments and equipment, and documentation; who or what are 
the actors that initiate these associations; what form a patient, their1 illness, their body 
and other entities are subsequently endowed with; and how such associations may restrict 
other possible understandings from being achieved.  
 Part 1 ends with a discussion of power. ANT, I will argue, is well suited to 
exposing the relations that constitute power.  Here I will discuss Foucault’s rendering of 
the concept as both a productive and repressive force and I will add that, contrary to 
some criticisms, Foucault did account for states of domination. By following the actors 
in medical practices and tracing the formation of associations, we can see how it is that 
relations can be productive, in that they produce particular kinds of patients and bodies; 
and repressive, in that they can prevent the expression of alternative forms of the patient 
and body.  I will argue that associations which have become durable or more stable can 
result in perpetually asymmetrical power relations, or domination. Such associations can 
be found in various medical technologies, which, due to the fixed nature of their 
componentry, dictate what sort of entities will be included in assemblages that produce 
accounts of the body. In this particular case, these entities are nearly always somatic, and 
are employed at the exclusion of the patient’s expressions, anxieties and opinions. In 
medical contexts, then, it is not unusual for technologies, when used by highly trained 
staff, to produce accounts of the body that have no input from patients themselves, aside 
from a sample of ir body. ANT, I will argue, provides an excellent method for 
                                                
1 “Their” and “they” will be used as singular indefinite pronouns throughout this project, in 
order to avoid using the awkward “his or her” and “he or she”. This is acceptable usage 
according to the 2004 edition of The Cambridge Guide to English Usage.  
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uncovering how it is that medical practices, particular those that involve non-human 
objects, generate order during the processes of diagnosis. Not only does it allow us to 
identify how entities become intelligible, but also how, through technologies, the same 
type of somatic-based accounts are produced again and again.  
 
The second part of this thesis, Medicine in Action, is the application of this ANT-based 
method to the case study. Using the collected video and audio data, we will follow the 
patient, Simon, as he becomes entwined in three separate medical practices, all of which 
aim to discern the nature of his chest pain. Part 2, then, is divided into three sections, 
each section focusing on one of the medical practices. The first section, Enacting Pain is 
based on Simon’s consultation with his GP.  Here Simon explains to his GP that he has 
been experiencing some chest pains, and via the GP’s line of questioning, he explains 
whereabouts on his body it is located, how often it occurs, and he also discloses a history 
of smoking and a family history of heart disease.  Additionally, Simon indicates that his 
pain may be related to anxiety. Here I will show how, through the interaction between 
Simon and the GP, chest pain becomes intelligible and subsequently becomes the basis 
for initiating further courses of action. 
 One course of action that the GP recommends is that Simon undergoes a 
treadmill stress test. This is the focus of Section Two, Enacting the Heart.  The treadmill 
stress test takes place at a specialist clinic, and is conducted by a cardiologist with the aid 
of a technician. The test requires Simon to run on a treadmill, thus stressing the heart, 
while he is attached to a device producing an electrocardiogram or ECG. Simon is told 
by the cardiologist that this device will indicate whether his heart is damaged and is the 
cause of his chest pain. Conducting the test involves the very careful and controlled 
construction of an assemblage which insures that only a select few entities within 
Simon’s body are made to interact and thus produce an account of the heart. The 
cardiologist and the technician are the principal actors in producing this account, while 
Simon is rendered little more than a compliant body. At the conclusion of the procedure, 
the cardiologist states the test indicates that Simon’s heart is healthy and free from 
blockages or narrowings that might cause chest pain.    
 The third section, Coordinating Reality, is based in the post-treadmill test debrief 
between the cardiologist and Simon. Here the cardiologist attempts to make sense of the 
account of chest pain that was produced in the GP consultation, and the account of the 
heart that was produced by the electrocardiogram. There is a potential conundrum here 
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for the cardiologist. He must somehow make sense of the fact that Simon is experiencing 
chest pain, yet his heart appears to be healthy.  He therefore employs two tactics to 
ameliorate the possible contradiction. Firstly, he postulates another cause: the pain, he 
states, is probably related to anxiety, or may even be stomach-related. Secondly, he 
questions the reliability of the account produced by the treadmill stress test: he states that 
it is a simple, fallible screening test, and may not provide an accurate picture of the heart.  
Simon is therefore told that his heart is probably healthy, but because this cannot be 
guaranteed, he should self-monitor his body for additional symptoms, and also self-
regulate his everyday activities to insure he engages in plenty of exercise while avoiding 
certain foods and cigarettes. Here, then, we have an interaction, an assemblage, that 
produces an indefinite diagnosis of the heart: the heart is most likely healthy, but because 
this is not assured, Simon must carefully regulate his behavior. Additionally, then, we also 
have the production of a certain type of patient: a self-monitoring, self responsible 
individual. 
 
 The project concludes by suggesting that perhaps a lot of medicine is conducted 
in this fashion. Rather than making a definite, assured diagnosis, medical professionals 
are often dealing more with probable diagnoses and managing the risks that this 
uncertainty entails.  I will also discuss what we have witnessed in relation to the 
biomedical model which is said to underlie medical practice. Some tenets of the 
biomedical model do appear in some of the practices we will follow, such as the ignoring 
of non-somatic elements in the production of accounts of the body during the treadmill 
stress test. This was not so in the GP consultation, where the patient’s family history, 
lifestyle and anxieties were utilized in the production of the account.  It is unfair to 
chastise medicine as a whole, therefore, for adhering to the biomedical model. I will also 
argue that during Simon’s foray in the healthcare system, he was essentially enacted as 
three types of patient. In the GP consultation, he was an accounting, expressive actor. In 
the treadmills stress test, he was simply a compliant, fleshy body, and in the post-test 
debrief, he was encouraged to become a self-responsible individual. Using Mol’s term, he 
represents a patchwork singularity (2002): he is the product of three assemblages or 
interactions, bound together as one, single patient: “Simon”.  I will end by stating that 
with the method we have adopted, the sociologist is well placed to challenge those 
circumstances in medicine where domination is occurring. If indeed medicine does often 
deal with indefinite diagnoses and uncertainties, then we should be suspicious of those 
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cases where certainty is being claimed, particularly if the account that is produced is 
causing considerable stress for the patients.  Here I use Rhodes et. al. (2002) example of 
patients with chronic back pain, who have been told by medical professionals that, 
according to the accounts produced by various instruments, there is nothing physically 
wrong with them.  In such circumstances, the sociologist can challenge such accounts by 
emphasizing the inherent uncertainty of accounts, as we witnessed in our case study.  By 
highlighting uncertainly, we can potentially provide a margin for the patient to be more 
included in the production of accounts of their own body. 
 
This project, then, is something of a proposal about how sociology of medicine can be 
conducted. Following in the vein of Garfinkel’s studies of everyday interactions, and by 
expanding our vision to include non-human entities, we can unravel how it is that order 
is achieved: how it is that humans and non-humans construct an intelligible world and 
thus a world were actions take place. The goal, to play on a phrase of Foucault’s, is to 
witness the everyday ordering of things: the ordering of objects and instruments, individuals 
and bodies, patients and medical professionals. In addition, the sociologist can do more 
than simply provide their own descriptive accounts. With a detailed knowledge of such 
ordering practices, the sociologist, it is hoped, can intervene, should there be a political 
or ethical imperative to do so.     
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1 - The Metaphysics of ANT 
 
 
THE MOST RECENT EDITION of the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology makes no mention 
of the approach that forms the basis of this thesis. Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has 
emerged from Science and Technology Studies and its proponents have, for some time 
now, been making a case for its inclusion into sociology practice. If the content of the 
Oxford Dictionary is taken as a statement of what sociology is, then these proponents 
still have some work to do. It is perhaps not surprising that there has been some 
reluctance to include ANT into the sphere of accepted sociology. Some of its key 
premises initially seem quite odd and are incompatible with the more popular and 
traditional approaches in sociology: the social is flat, non-human objects can be actors, 
spatial and temporal scales are the effect of actors, to name a few oddities of ANT.  
These peculiar assertions are the result of a metaphysics that has no heritage in the work 
of Marx, Durkheim or Weber; the founding fathers of sociology, or even in the 
enlightenment forefathers, Kant and Hobbs.  
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 Instead, ANT has its lineage in the work of other thinkers. ANT was generated 
in response to following scientists in the laboratory (see Latour and Woolgar 1979/1986) 
but many of its key principles are found in the work of Gabriel Tarde and Manuel 
DeLanda. The approach I am adopting here diverges markedly from what sociology is 
usually considered to be. Except for the purposes of comparison, there is no mention of 
Durkheim or Weber, and certainly no lengthy exegesis on the work of Marx. My 
intention in this first section is to outline the metaphysics I will adopt in this thesis; a 
metaphysics that is indebted heavily to Tarde and DeLanda and forms the basis of the 
ANT approach that I am using. I hope to show how it is that ANT espouses such 
seemingly odd premises and, more importantly, how such principles provide us with a 
very useful and insightful method for the sociology of medicine. 
 
Complexity and Sociology  
The motivation here for jettisoning a traditional sociological approach is that ANT is far 
better suited to dealing with complexity. Traditional approaches, particularly those 
associated with adherents to Weber, Durkheim and Marx, cannot fully explicate social 
phenomena because they deal with complexity by prematurely attributing causation to 
preset agents or structures (Latour 2005: 47-49). In the metaphysics I am adopting here, 
there are no preset agents or structures and therefore no hasty assigning of causation. 
Complexity is seen not as something that must be overcome but rather as something that 
is necessary for a good sociological account. Before I explain this point, let’s begin with 
an example of complexity. Below are four pictures of cardiovascular disease, each are 
real-life accounts and each can be said to be true in that they represent a largely 
uncontested reality of the disease.    
 
 Picture 1 
Cardiovascular disease was the second leading course of death after cancer in New 
Zealand in 2003, with 6196 deaths. The mortality rate has shown a downward trend, of 
about 50 percent, from 1987 to 2003. During this period males have had a consistently 
higher age-standardised mortality rate than females. In 2003, the male rate was 94.1 
percent higher than the female rate, although the male mortality rate does appear to be 
falling faster than that of females. Males succumb to the condition at a slightly earlier age 
than females; however, the mortality frequency is skewed toward the 65 plus age group 
for both sexes.  In 2003 the calculated Maori male age-standardised rate was 120 percent 
higher than that of non-Maori male rate, and the calculated Maori female rate was 84 
 13 
percent higher than the non-Maori female rate. The Ministry has sourced data from 
certificates of cause of death from doctors and coroners, post-mortem reports from 
private pathologists and hospitals and death registration forms. In order to reduce the 
overall heart disease morbidity and mortality rates, the Ministry has set a Health Target 
of improving nutrition, increasing physical activity and reducing obesity. The Healthy 
Eating – Healthy Action (HEHA) Strategy is the Government’s multi-faceted, integrated 
initiative to achieving this target. HEHA aims to encourage an “environment and society 
where individuals, families and whanau, and communities are supported to eat well, live 
physically active lives, and attain and maintain a healthy body weight”. (Ministry of 
Health, Manatû Hauora 2006, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2 
 
Ischemic heart disease is characterised by coronary atherosclerosis. Atherosclerosis 
results from the damaging of the endothelium that forms the internal wall of an artery. 
This is made up of smooth muscles cells, which, when damaged, fail to produce Nitrous 
Oxide (NO), a suppressor of immune function. In the absence of NO, the damaged 
endothelium produces a series of immune cell attractors, resulting in the recruitment and 
binding of macrophages and other immune cells to the damaged area. These immune 
cells infiltrate the damaged area and promote the production of more, non-NO 
producing smooth muscle cells.  Over time, fats, cholesterol and calcium adhere to the 
inflamed area. These deposits gradually build up and form a light-yellow plaque that 
narrows the lumen within coronary arteries, severally restricting blood flow. This plaque 
becomes calcified, and in some cases may rupture resulting in a thrombus. The result of 
coronary atherosclerosis is recurrent angina and in many cases myocardial infarction. 
(Cheong 2004) 
 
  
 
 
Picture 3  
 
AstraZeneca today announced that it has entered into a licensing deal with Atherogenics, 
Inc. for the development and commercialisation of their anti-inflammatory 
cardiovascular product candidate, AGI-1067. AGI-1067 is an oral drug for the treatment 
of the underlying cause of cardiovascular disease, atherosclerosis. Under the terms of the 
agreement AtheroGenics will receive and upfront fee of $50 million and if successfully 
commercialised, AtheroGenics will be eligible for fees and milestones of up to $1 billion. 
“The collaboration with AtheroGenics is an important step in AstraZeneca’s plans to 
further strengthen its cardiovascular franchise”, said Dr John Patterson, Executive 
Director, Development for AstraZeneca. The partnering of these two companies 
represents a win-win situation: AstraZeneca gets exclusive access to the drug while 
AtheroGenics will benefit significantly from the commercial success. “AGI-1067 has the 
real potential to further enhance our position among the leaders in cardiovascular 
medicine.” The commercialisation of AGI-1067 would also provide AtheroGenics with 
additional resources to begin its transition from a research and development organisation 
to a commercial enterprise. (AstraZeneca 2005)  
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Picture 4 
 
 David Slack recently threw a party. As guests arrived, the amiable host affixed plastic 
hospital ID bracelets to their wrists. Canapes and hors d’oeuvres were served by Mary 
Margeret, Slack’s daughter who wore green surgical scrubs and delivered her snacks on a 
hospital trolley. The medical paraphernalia was far from gimmicky. For Slack, 48, was 
celebrating his “21st” – 21 years since he suffered a heart attack that doctors described as 
“catastrophic”. Slack went on to tell of the day when he received a grim prognosis at 
Dargaville Hospital. “If there’s any light to go towards, I didn’t see it. I’ve been smacked 
in the face and its hurt more than the pain in the chest, but the whole nausea and sense 
of dislocation and general unease and imminent collapse is very perturbing. Even my 
natural optimism couldn’t overcome that, and it took me quite a while to get over the 
notion that my life really might be truncated.” After more than two decades of physical 
self improvement, the North Shore local’s future looks bright. Having retooled his diet 
and cut out his vices, he plans to run a marathon. This year, after listening enviously to 
his brother’s tales of participating in races in New York and Helsinki, he is keen to 
complete the full 42km. “This is the kind of thing that really does help you persevere. 
You do the training for a marathon and everything else about your health drops into step 
as well,” he says. “And it feels great”. (Nippert 2008) 
 
These four pictures all represent some reality of cardiovascular disease, each 
incorporating different elements into their account. As we can see, cardiovascular disease 
is not just a medical phenomenon. It is entwined in commercial practices, discourses on 
governance and individual life-histories and it can be made intelligible in terms of 
ethnicity, gender and population eating habits, cellular and molecular aetiology, 
commercial strategy and chest pains, nausea and unease. Although the four pictures are 
quite different, none need be considered any less real than another. This heterogeneity of 
disease raises a question for the social scientist who wishes to undertake a study into 
medicine: how do we go about deciding what sort of elements should be included in a 
sociological account of the disease? If we were to include all elements, then a sociological 
account would potentially be unmanageable. 
 At this point I will borrow a concept from the philosophy of science: 
supervenience. The term is used to describe the relationship between sets of properties, 
where one set (set A) of properties is established by another set (set B). This relationship 
is not reciprocal, however. Set B may come about through the existence of other sets, or 
a collection of sets, without the presence of Set A (Sober 200: 74-75). This analytical 
term is useful for us here because it adequately describes the relationship of 
cardiovascular disease to the sets of elements presented in the above accounts. In each of 
the accounts, cardiovascular disease is brought about through the existence of a distinct 
set of elements and no one set or type of properties seems to be essential for 
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cardiovascular disease to be intelligible: there is no mention of nitrous oxide and 
endothelial damage in the life-history, and there is no mention of ethnicity, gender and 
Healthy Eating, Healthy Action in the commercial account. In this respect, 
cardiovascular disease supervenes on a range of elements or properties, some of which 
are “commercial”, some of which are “biomedical” and some of which are “personal”. 
Endothelial damage, nitrous oxide production and macrophage recruitment are elements 
of the diseases, just as are poor diet, obesity and ethnicity.  
 It is important to note here that cardiovascular disease supervenes on elements 
that vary in size and complexity. From population eating habits and commercial 
initiatives to macrophages and molecules of nitrous oxide, there is no straightforward 
relationship between macro and micro, complex and simple. As any epidemiologist 
would inform us, understanding the occurrence of disease requires a knowledge of 
various large scale population factors, not just cellular aetiology.  Following threads, we 
may begin with a damaged endothelium and find ourselves moving through the world of 
corporate strategy, multi-million dollar transfers and shareholders; or, alternatively, we 
may just as easily find ourselves amongst the everyday anxieties of families: pain, 
loneliness and death. The unsettling realisation that supposedly “micro” elements are 
composed of “macro” elements with just as much frequency as the reverse indicates that 
these a priori definitions of scale are perhaps not very useful at all. 
Adding to this dizzying perplexity of scale is a problem of quantity. Already in 
the pictures above we are presented with numerous elements, but these elements also 
supervene on others, which, in turn, supervene on other elements and so on: Nitrous 
oxide behaviour supervenes on particular atomic capacities; obesity supervenes on 
exercise patterns, calories and modern work habits; AGI-1067 supervenes on business 
models and a plethora of legal considerations.  Here is the conundrum for a sociologist, 
or indeed any specialist, who wishes to make sense of the disease: if cardiovascular 
disease potentially supervenes on an endless quantity of elements, how do we decide 
which require further explication and which ones to ignore?  
These problems of scale and quantity reflect the monadic character of the 
disease.  The “monad” provides a useful analytic tool for understanding the sort of 
complexity and mess that I have highlighted above, and it will also provide me with a 
starting ontological framework for this thesis. This term originated in Leibniz’s work 
(1714) and was adopted and modified by the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde 
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(1893/1999), a contemporary of Durkheim. Tarde and Durkheim had very different 
conceptions of society which led them to two very different assertions for how sociology 
should be conducted. Durkheim promoted a sociology that studied social facts. These, 
he argued, have an independent existence outside of the actions of individuals and are 
distinct from material or physical phenomena. Social facts constitute a “social reality” 
which exists prior to the realities of individuals, informing their behaviour and thus 
providing society with rigidity (Durkheim 1982). By examining social facts, he argued, the 
sociologist can come to understand the behaviour of entire societies. Here, society is 
seen as the cause of associations between people2. Tarde, however, made no such 
distinction between the social and the individual, or the social and the physical or 
material: “everything is a society and that all things are society” (Tarde, cited in Latour 
2005: 218). “Social” is what happens when things associate, and these things may 
associate in a physical way, a biological way, a legal way or a religious way. Society is the 
consequence of associations, not their cause (Latour 2005: 238). For Tarde, the “social” 
is often material, and tracing which things associate together and how this is achieved is 
the key to understanding the composition of the resulting society (Latour 2005: 13).  
Leibniz’s notion of the monad provided Tarde with a useful analytical tool for 
conceptualising this idea of societies. According to Tarde, the universe is made of 
monads which are not material entities in-themselves, but neither are they ideal forms or 
representations of things. A monad is a group of associated elements, aggregates, which 
have a material existence. Monads do not have any goal or grand design, they do not 
exist because of their function and while their form may change this cannot be explained 
in terms of some “higher order” (Latour 2001: 2).  Importantly, the associations that 
compose a monad are heterogeneous in that the elements involved may be either human 
or non-human; neither type can be separated from the other or granted a status as being 
more “essential”.  Consequently, unlike the Durkheimiam tradition, there is no divide 
between society and nature, and envisaging such a divide does not aid in understanding 
                                                
2
 I have presented here what Levine refers to as Talcott Parson’s “strikingly partial” reading of 
Durkheim, which focuses solely on the rationalist dimension of his work (1995: 46). Shilling and 
Mellor (1998) have argued that this widespread interpretation has overshadowed Durkheim’s 
more nuanced exploration of embodiment, effervesces and the construction of social order 
found in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1915). Latour refers to The Elementary Forms as 
Durkheim’s “Tardian moment” (2005: 38) 
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human interactions. Cardiovascular disease, as we have seen, supervenes on a range of 
elements associating in ways that traverse any clear society/nature divide. A monad is 
composed of associations that are not ideal or spiritual, but are real, such as the 
interaction between immune cell attractors and macrophages, AtheroGenics and AGI-
1067, age-standardized mortality rate and sex. Following Tarde, all these associations are 
social and it is these numerous associations that comprise the social world.  
Initially it may seem that this monadic conception of disease does not provide 
much aid to the sociologist, as the Tardian sociologist is confronted with a dizzying array 
of elements and complexity. Traditional sociology, following Durkheim, has a method 
for dealing with this complexity. By envisaging a social reality that is distinct from other 
realms, the Durkhiemian sociologist disregards most of the elements involved and 
instead focuses on those that are deemed “social”. The risk of this approach, however, is 
that the sociologist has prematurely delimited the phenomena they are attempting to 
explain and their account loses explanatory power. If we follow the monadic conception, 
societies are the consequence of assemblages between heterogeneous elements and there 
is, therefore, no distinction between the “social” and other forms of association. A 
Durkheimiam risks overlooking the stuff that society is actually made up of. This leads 
me to the first premise of this project: If we accept that sociology can exist without having to 
envisage a separate social realm, and instead accept the complexity and heterogeneity of elements that 
constitute the social, we have the potential to trace phenomena as they are and therefore provide a more 
thorough account of the relations that constitute power.  With the monadic conception, we are not 
provided with any a priori criteria for determining what type of elements should be 
included in a sociologist’s account.  
The monadic account of society also provides a very useful alternative way of 
thinking about scale. As we have seen in our pictures of cardiovascular disease, the 
disease monad supervenes on elements that vary markedly in scale: a component of 
cardiovascular disease is not necessarily smaller or less complex than the disease itself.  In 
Durkheimiam sociology, scale and complexity increases as we move from the individual 
to the “higher order” society.  In organic solidarity summarized in The Division of Labour 
in Society, the modern individual is socialised into particular, specialised roles and inter-
relations sanctioned by society, so that “although society is nothing without individuals, 
each one of them is more of a product of society than he is the author” (1984: 288). 
Solidarity is the result of complementary relations between actors who must cooperate 
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with one another in order to meet those needs that their own, highly specialised labour 
cannot attain. Consequently, each individual is only ever the embodiment of a minute, 
discrete section of the collective whole that must encompass all the roles, beliefs and 
codes necessary for its own survival. Individuals are effectively rendered as an atom 
defined by their function in maintaining the higher order. Tarde’s monadic account of 
societies leads him to make quite different assertions concerning scale.  Firstly, the 
“smaller” entity is often more complex: 
If we look at the social world… we see agents, the humans, much more differentiated, much 
 more individually characterised, much richer in continuous variations, than the government 
 apparatus, the system of laws and beliefs, even the dictionaries and the grammars which are 
 maintained through their activities. An historical fact is simpler and clearer than any of the mental 
 states of any of the actors participating in it. (Tarde, cited in Latour 2001: 4) 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Secondly, Tarde illustrates that the so called “macro” is nothing more than the 
simplification and extension of one component of the “micro”.  He uses language as an 
example: 
People who speak, all with different accents, intonations, pitches, voices, gestures: here is the 
 social element, the true chaos of discordant heterogeneities. But in the long run, from this 
 confusing Babel, a few general habits will be outlined and formulated in grammatical laws.    
 (Tarde, quoted Latour 2001: 4)                                                                                                                 
 
Collectives, cultures, classes, and nation-states are the effect of the standardization and 
simplification of some qualities of their elementary components that, for whatever 
reason, have disseminated to some degree from their origin. The macro is nothing more 
than an extension of the micro (Latour 2001: 3). This is far removed from Durkheim’s 
world. We no longer have a leviathan socialising individuals into functional roles: instead 
we have enormously diverse agents with complex habits, customs, opinions and beliefs, 
whose activities and inter-relations have no higher-order goal, but where some of these 
opinions, beliefs, habits and actions come to be rendered as representational or essential 
qualities. This extension or dissemination occurs when these qualities are actively 
practiced by agents outside of their origin, but it does not mean that they come to 
dominate the “society” they are said to represent.  In Tardian sociology, the “macro” is 
not bigger, more complex or all-encompassing; it is simply those few qualities or goals of 
complex, elementary monads that have managed to become more connected by 
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operating outside their original locus.  With this in mind, a priori macro and micro 
divisions are of little use in attempting to uncover the associations that constitute society. 
Here we have the second premise of this thesis: The micro/macro distinction is not useful for 
understanding the relations that constitute power.  What is useful is understanding how some 
qualities disseminate from their origin while others do not; how it is that some practices, 
beliefs or actions come to have an effect on elements that were not previously 
implicated, and how this effect is maintained.  
 The monadic conception has alleviated the problems of scale we encountered 
with cardiovascular disease.  Rather than being faced with the confusing dilemma of a 
disease that supervenes on supposedly macro and micro elements, we have a monadic 
disease that supervenes on a range of elements whose complexity varies markedly 
according to the associations they form with other elements.  Aside from this redefining 
scale and the prohibition on reifying a distinction between “social” and “material’, there 
are other important consequences of using the monad as an ontological starting point. 
Firstly, it allows us to conceive of social parts without the risk of essentialism or 
functionalism.  Since “macro” is simply the extension and standardisation of some 
qualities of elements, the complexity and diversity of elements always surpasses that of 
any supposed higher order.  Individuals, groups or any assemblage cannot be adequately 
defined or understood simply in terms of their capacity to maintain any other assemblage 
or group. We can contrast this with Durkheim’s conception of society, where individuals 
and groups are the result of the functional qualities invested within them by a society, 
and also classical Marxism, where social roles and occupations reflect the mode of 
production.  While functionalism has largely been dismissed by academic sociology, this 
underlying logic concerning the relations between social parts is often still present in 
contemporary sociology, albeit in a more sophisticated form. As Manuel DeLanda puts 
it:  
 [the logic] still exerts considerable influence in most schools of sociology, and in this form it is 
 more difficult to eliminate. This version involves not an analogy but a general theory about the 
 relations  between parts and wholes, wholes that constitute a seamless totality or that display an 
 organic unity. The basic concept in this theory is what we may call relations of interiority: the 
 component parts are constituted by the very relations they have to other parts in the whole.           
 (DeLanda 2006: 9) 
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The monadic account is comparable to Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory of society 
and some more of his terminology is of use here.  While functionalism and much 
contemporary social theory employs the relations of interiority model, monadology and 
DeLanda’s assemblage theory assume relations of exteriority. Here, an element may be 
removed from one assemblage and placed in another, and although different capacities 
may be exercised as a result, its potential for entering particular types or relations remains 
unchanged (DeLanda 2006: 11). This indicates that its potential for interactions always 
exceeds what is actually realised by being immersed within a particular assemblage and it 
cannot, therefore, be reduced to any seemingly “functional” capacity that may be 
exercised. Elements, then, have innumerable capacities for interaction which are only 
perceptible when they become associated with other elements. We might define an 
element by some of its qualities for convenience, but its potential for expressing other 
numerous qualities means that it will always escape any attempt to determine the 
element’s essence. All elements, then, have noticeable qualities or characteristics that are 
the result of being assembled with certain other elements, as well as numerous, indefinite, 
unactualised capacities which will potentially be realised when the element becomes part 
of a novel assemblage (DeLanda 2002: 71).  We can see that this is very similar to the 
complexity that Tarde refers to.  The complexity of elements always exceeds that of 
those qualities that have become so-called “macro”, and by adopting Tarde and 
DeLanda’s ontology (and at this point I am using “assemblage” and “monad” 
interchangeably), we avoid any tendency to essentialise elements or reduce them to any 
function they may serve. An important point here is that the intelligibility of an element 
is always the consequence of an assemblage: the elements within an assemblage are 
themselves assemblages, or to put this in Tarde’s terms, we have monads within monads.  
Consequently, it is assemblages that construct our world and populate it with entities by 
making them intelligible through associations. It is only through associations that 
capacities are enacted, and atoms, molecules, cells, individuals, collectives, species, 
nation-states, and indeed the universe, become knowable.   
 While Tarde, as we have seen, illustrates how the supposed higher order is 
achieved through the extension and standardisation of some qualities of the elementary, 
there is an oversight that is remedied in DeLanda’s assemblage theory. By abolishing the 
conception of the macro as being larger and more complex, we do not also need to 
forfeit the notion that the “macro” is no more than the aggregate of its parts.  It is 
possible, according to DeLanda, for the “macro” to have properties that are different 
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from the properties of any constituent elements. These emergent properties are the result of 
interactions between the exercised capacities of separate elements (DeLanda 2002: 72). 
So, some qualities of an element may be standardized and have an effect that extends 
outside of their original locus, and these qualities may also interact with those of other 
elements that have also been extended and standardized, resulting in a novel set of 
effects that are quite separate to those of the constituting elements. 
 The reason for the elaborate outline of this ontology is that it has major 
repercussions for the way sociologists approach their subject matter. If we were to follow 
the logic that underlies functionalism and much contemporary social theory, where social 
parts are constituted purely by the relations they have to other parts, then interactions 
between them would be logically necessary. That is, the parts are constituted by relations 
that are necessary for maintaining the whole, and therefore the investigation of parts can 
be done via thought alone. In the ontology I have adopted here, however, the 
interactions that occur between parts are not logically necessary, but continually obligatory 
(DeLanda 2006: 11). Emergent properties and the interactions between monads or 
assemblages are the consequence of complex inherent dynamics within elements that 
have no higher order objective. They are, essentially, unforeseen consequences. Since 
there is no general logic governing emergent properties, understanding how they come 
about, and how they are maintained requires an empirical method that can follow the 
complex, inherent dynamics that generate particular effects. The sociologist, then, must 
empirically investigate how it is that particular associations form between elements, and 
how some of these associations result in emergent properties.   
 If emergent properties cannot be reduced to elementary components, then we 
cannot equate causation with the activities of individuals. Contrary to the assertions of 
methodological individualists, it is possible for collectives or assemblages to act in ways 
that differ from the actions or intent of individuals that constitute them. As DeLanda 
puts it: 
 Assemblages larger than individual persons have an objective existence because they can 
 causally affect the people that are their component parts, limiting them and enabling 
 them, and because they can usually affect other assemblages…  The fact that these 
 assemblages must use people as a medium of interactions does not compromise their 
 ontological autonomy anymore than the fact that some people must use some of their 
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 body parts to interact with the material world compromises their own relative autonomy 
 from their anatomical components. (DeLanda 2006: 39) 
 
Individuals may have needs, wants and impulses that they act upon, but their intended 
course of action will more often than not be hindered, distorted or transformed by other 
elements whose behaviour cannot be fully predicted or controlled. The actual outcome is 
different from what was intended, and explaining the result therefore requires an 
explication of all the elements involved, which are not, necessarily, other individuals.  In 
this respect, verstehen is not a sufficient methodological approach for the social scientist. 
There is an additional reason why we should avoid conceiving the individual as a starting 
point for sociological enquiry. If elements have numerous capacities for interaction, and 
their intelligible form is the consequence of being assembled with other elements, then 
the individual is not a transcendendal universal but an effect; the consequence of various 
associations that enact particular capacities of interaction. This is a point that Latour 
makes quite clear: “to be a realistic whole is not an undisputed starting point but the 
achievement of a complex assemblage” (2005: 276). This is not to say that the individual 
as we know it is simply a product of “society”, nor do we need to deny the materiality of 
the body; rather, in the ontology we have adopted here, we must recognise that the 
individual is the consequence of a complex assemblage like any other intelligible element. 
Figurations of individuality, subjectivity, personhood and decision-making are capacities 
that are being enacted by various interactions with other elements which may be acting 
across spatial and temporal distances. If a rational, individual human actor exists, it is a 
temporary product, not an a priori universal (Latour 2006: 207).  
 Michel Callon provides us with an illustration. Using Marie-France Garcia’s work 
(Garcia 1986) on the establishment of a strawberry market in the region of Salogne, 
France, Callon demonstrates how the calculating, rational individual is the temporary 
product of various market practices. The strawberry market was modelled on neoclassical 
theory and its formation involved the careful arranging of devices to insure that agents 
and merchandise were clearly defined and dislocated from one another so that 
decentralised exchange could take place. Importantly, this involved the construction of a 
space of calculability: transactions were displayed on an electronic board, batches of 
produce (each with their own data-slip) were displayed side-by-side, the technique of 
digressive bidding, and formal measurement units were utilised. Buyers and sellers were 
 23 
also physically separated to insure that exchange was impersonal. This alignment of 
elements had the effect of configuring homo economicus: an informed, calculating agent 
(Callon 1999: 192-193).  An individual actor, like all other elements, must be seen as the 
consequence of processes of association that allow some capacities for interaction to be 
expressed. We have then, what Callon refers to as the radical indeterminacy of the actor 
(1999: 181): the needs, wants, motivations and decision making abilities, and indeed even 
the form of the actor, cannot be assumed before the fact. As I shall demonstrate further 
on, this has major implications for the way social scientists approach medical practices.   
 It may seem that with this conception of the actor as a product that we have 
eradicated the potential source for agency. This is not so.  Firstly, it must be recognised 
that in the monad or assemblage conception of the social, there is no ultimate source or 
cause for action. Action occurs when one element is made to act by another.  As Latour 
puts it “action is not a coherent, well-rounded and clean affair. By definition action is 
dislocated: borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed and 
translated” (2006: 46). We can use the example of a buyer at the strawberry market 
illustrated above. An individual makes a decision to purchase a batch of strawberries 
after a careful consideration of their quality, cost of previous transactions and the price.  
 The individual’s rational calculability that underlies their action is a capacity that 
has been configured by a particular arrangement of devices. Is the cause of the action, 
then, the individual or the electronic display board, the batch data-slips, the digressive 
bidding technique and the formal measurement units, without which the resultant action 
would never have occurred? Or is the source of the action the young counsellor of the 
Regional Chamber of Agriculture, an economic graduate who modelled the market on 
the principles of neoclassical theory? Perhaps the theory itself is the cause of the action, 
or the counsellor’s economics professors and textbooks, or Friedrich Hayek? The point 
is, if we attempt to find an ultimate source of action, we are led through a chain of 
associations that would eventually bring us to the Big Bang. This does not mean we have 
no agents, however. What we have above is several points were action does not begin, 
but is altered or translated: textbook liberal economics is translated into a market place 
with a particular form by the young counsellor; a person is translated into an individual, 
rational buyer by the market configuration; and so on. An agent is a point where action is 
translated, and thus a point that has acquired a particular form in the process and puts 
other entities into motion: it is itself an effect of associations that comes to have an 
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affect. As Latour puts it “An actor is what is made to act by other actors” (2005: 46). 
This brings us to the third premise of this project: By recognising that an actor is the 
consequence of an assemblage and not an a priori source of action, we can better understand how entities 
are made intelligible through translation and, therefore, how the world becomes populated with forms. 
  
 In the ontology of Tarde and DeLanda that I have outlined so far there is a 
conception of the society that varies substantially from that usually employed in 
sociology. The social is not a distinct realm embodied by the collective as envisaged by 
Durkheim, and social parts cannot be reduced to their relation to the whole. And society 
is not, as some would suggest, the consequence of the actions of individuals. Both these 
accounts along with the Marxist conception of society prematurely assign causation to 
preset agents or structures. Following the metaphysics I have adopted here, both “agent” 
and “structure” are the momentary effects of an assemblage that endows form upon 
entities through a process of translation. These assemblages are heterogeneous in that 
they involve associations that vary markedly: some may be medical, some may be 
religious and others may be legal, and so on. It is these assemblages, or monads as I have 
also referred to them, that constitute the social. By granting elements form and enrolling 
them into particular types of action, assemblages both populate the world with 
knowledgeable entities and put it into motion. These are the assertions of Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) and we can now see the basis for its odd allegations: if both 
structures and agents are the result of associations, and the macro is simply the extension 
and standardisation of the micro, then the social is flat: non-human elements can enrol 
other entities and endow them with form just as humans can, and non-human objects 
therefore qualify as actors. So, with these points in mind, what does this mean for the 
sociologist who wishes to conduct an investigation into medicine and medical practices?  
 Let us go back to the cardiovascular disease monad and the four accounts at the 
beginning of this section. Firstly, if associations are heterogeneous and there is no 
distinct social realm, then the ANT sociologist does not have to carve up medical 
practices into the “social stuff” and the “biological-medical stuff”, the former being the 
sociologist’s domain of study, and the latter being either the effect of the social stuff or 
the domain of the scientist. Instead, all associations are potentially open to sociological 
investigation. To bracket-off or prioritise some type of associations would amount to 
prematurely assigning form or figuration to that which is being explained. Picture 2, the 
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cellular aetiology of the disease, is potentially of as much interest to the sociologist as 
Picture 1, the government’s response, or Picture 4, the lived experience of the disease. 
There has been a tendency in the sociology of medicine to focus simply on those aspects 
traditionally considered as “social” and ignore those that are not. Such is the logic behind 
the separation between “disease”, deemed as the physical affliction, and “illness”, the-
lived experience of the affliction (Mol 2002: 7-9). Along this line, some social scientists 
have chastised medical professionals for failing to acknowledge social elements of 
diseases by focusing solely on somatic elements (Engel 1981, Nettleton 1995). Whether 
such criticism is justified is doubtful. In Annemarie Mol’s ethnography of medical 
practices, The Body Multiple (2002), “social” factors, such as a patient’s occupation, hopes, 
sources of enjoyment, are often used by surgeons to assess the appropriateness of 
treatments for atherosclerosis (2002: 70-71). I hope to shed some light on this debate in 
this project. 
 Secondly, if complexity always escapes the standardisation and extension that 
produces “macro” effects, then an empirical method is necessary. An element is not fully 
constituted by any macro characteristics or emergent properties it may have, and it 
cannot, therefore, be reduced to any social function it may have or its effects on class, 
ethnicity or gender. In the case of medicine, although it has the capacity to affect those 
things usually considered as social, such as identities, subjectivities and gender, the 
complexity and diversity of medical practices always exceeds any attempts to explain 
them in these terms. Knowledge of a practice’s function is not an adequate basis to 
understand the practice itself. This is a mistake that has often been made by sociologists. 
Conrad for example, has argued that medicine functions as a mechanism for social 
control (Conrad 1979). Medical ideology, medical collaboration, and medical technology 
function to eliminate deviance and insure an individual’s adherence to particular norms: 
“by medical control I mean the ways in which medicine functions (wittingly or 
unwittingly) to secure adherence to social norms: specifically by using medical means to 
minimize, eliminate, or normalise deviant behaviour” (Conrad 1979: 1). While particular 
medical practices may have the effect, in some cases, of endorsing some forms of 
behaviour over others, Conrad’s account risks reducing medical practices to their social 
function. In DeLanda’s parlance, Conrad is suggesting that medicine is constituted by the 
relations it has with behavioural norms and deviance control: it is defined in terms of its 
function.  
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 Similarly, other social theorists have argued that medicine is an instrument of 
patriarchal control. Gena Corea, for instance, has argued that In-Vitro Fertilization is a 
means of controlling reproduction and therefore constitutes a mechanism for male 
ownership over female sexuality (1987). Again, while medical practices may, in some 
instances, have the effect of reducing the agency of women, the sociologists should be 
aware that practices are far more varied, complex and inconsistent than such an account 
would indicate. This is a point made clear in Mol’s work, The Body Multiple (2002), based 
on an ethnography of the practices involved in diagnosis and treatment of 
atherosclerosis. She noted that even within one hospital, numerous techniques and 
practices are used to make sense of the disease and as a result, illness and the body are 
enacted in multiple ways. Rather than being comprised of a series of stable, fixed 
relations, medicine and disease are characterised by numerous practices that assemble 
bodies, patients, professionals and illness in varying networks. The result of this is an 
irreducible diversity and complexity that cannot be adequately defined in terms of some 
higher order function or ideological effect. Medicine is far from being a dominating, 
unified authority: it involves numerous, divergent, and sometime contested practices. If 
we are to understand exactly how it is that medical practices come to populate a world 
and provide it with motion, we are required to follow Mol’s example and follow the 
practices as they occur, regardless of how messy the pursuit may be. 
 This brings us to our next commitment: we must accept the radical 
indeterminacy of the actor. Rather than assuming that certain entities are always actors 
while other entities will only ever provide conduits for action, the sociologist who 
approaches medicine can accept that the agents of translation can potentially have any 
form. The list of possible actors multiplies enormously. Not only doctors, nurses, 
patients, and specialists, but also nitrous oxide, macrophages, AGI-1067, and a plethora 
of instruments and documents may be granted the lofty status of “actor”. We can see 
now why it is so important not to restrict sociology to an investigation of the “social”, as 
so many agents would escape our view. This is particularly true in medicine, which, 
Timmermans and Berg point out, “forms an archaeology of layer upon layer of 
technologies from the most mundane band-aids to pencils and sophisticated machines 
such as MRIs and artificial hearts” (2003: 98-99). And, as Latour has illustrated in his 
ethnographies of scientific practice, it is often non-human objects and technologies that 
are fundamental components in the construction of particular facts and realities (Latour 
and Woolgar 1986). Instruments, like humans, have the ability to translate other entities, 
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put them into motion and therefore establish an association. Keeping in mind that 
emergent properties cannot be reduced to constituent elements, we must also be aware 
that actors may vary markedly according to the traditional notion of scale: institutions, 
businesses, unions and ministries may also prove to be acting as a single agent.  In short, 
the sociologist must be aware that actors can come in any form and emerge from 
anywhere: the test tube, a ministerial office, the sharemarket and so on. 
  
 We have dramatically increased our list of potential actors, but how do we know 
who or what is actually acting at any one point? If assemblages constitute the world, then 
uncovering which actors bring about their formation is necessary to understanding how a 
particular reality is brought about. The trick, then, is to uncover how others go about 
constructing the world, and not prematurely construct the world for them by imposing 
traditional sociological categories. As we have seen, the cardiovascular disease monad 
supervenes on an innumerable range of elements that vary in scale and form. Yet, in each 
one of the pictures I have provided, a coherent account of the disease has been 
constructed through the incorporation of a few elements and the culling of many, many 
more. Cardiovascular disease as a commercial opportunity is brought about through the 
association of AGI-1067, AstraZeneca, Dr John Patterson and an obscene quantity of 
cash. There is no mention of ethnicity, nitrous oxide or personal anxieties.  If we wish to 
understand how certain realities or facts are brought about, then we need to understand 
how practices entwine some elements in explanations while many others become elided, 
forgotten, or discounted. This can only be done if the sociologist forfeits all prejudices 
about who and what can act, as the agents that enrol and translate other elements while 
obscuring most others, will become visible.   
 Michel Callon gives us some idea of the things we should be looking for when we 
are attempting to locate points of translation and the formation of associations. Firstly, a 
translation will always begin with an explicit definition of an entity’s qualities (Callon 
1986: 204-205). A set of characteristics are effectively listed; perhaps in a written account 
or article, via dialogue, in a graph. These characteristics are said to define the inherent 
nature of the entity, which is often done in such a way that grants particular actors 
influence over the entity or those who may wish to utilise it. Callon gives the example of 
three researchers attempting to remedy the depletion of scallop beds in St. Brieuc Bay, 
France. In written documents, they define the scallops according to several key 
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characteristics: they are dredged from the sea; as larvae they are highly susceptible to 
predators; the larvae can anchor; the scallops are fundamentally similar to those 
cultivated in Japan. An entity, however, may refuse both the definition it has acquired 
and the list of qualities it is said to have. So, in order for the translation to occur, 
interessement is also necessary. Interessement is the “group of actions by which an 
[actor] attempts to impose and stabilise the identity of other actors it defines” (Callon 
1986: 207-208). This can be done in a multitude of ways, but interessement always has 
the effect of putting devices in place to insure that other, conflicting definitions of the 
entity in question are diluted or weakened. In Callon’s example, the form given to the 
scallops by the researchers is strengthened by the physical usage of towlines adopted 
from Japanese cultivation. The scallops attached to the towline as larvae, avoided 
predation and thus had their form asserted along with the hypotheses of the researchers. 
It is important to note here that it was only through the introduction of a device, an 
interessement device, that the scallops acquired their stable form: the material conditions 
of the environment had to be manipulated for the scallops to become intelligible in this 
way. Successful interessement, then, is the affirmation of an entity’s form and the culling 
of other possible characterizations, and it often occurs through the introduction of 
additional implements. In DeLanda’s terms, such implements are necessary to realise the 
entity’s capacities for interaction. Successful interessement qualifies as enrolment: the 
entity has been granted a configuration and its qualities and capacities have been 
delimited. But if this translation is to have any weight, then other elements will also need 
to be convinced that the granted form is, in fact, justified. If this does not occur, then 
our association so far will remain isolated and insignificant, bringing about no further 
effects and failing to provide any meaningful facts about the world. The third moment in 
translation, then, constitutes the formation of further associations and involves enrolling 
other elements. In Callon’s example, once the successful interessement of the scallops 
had occurred, the researchers were then able to enrol scientific colleagues. This involved 
convincing the colleagues of the scallop’s figuration via the use of carefully prepared 
scientific papers (an interessement device) so that they became active proponents in 
perpetuating this form of the scallop (1986: 212). As Latour puts it, the more actors 
included and more associations that form, the more “fact” the translation becomes 
(1987: 108). Here we see how it is that assemblages, alliances between numerous actors, 
come to populate the world with knowledgeable entities.  
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 So far we have three movements of translation that will allow us to detect the 
formations of associations and the actors involved: the explicit defining of an entity, the 
interessement of that entity, and the enrolment of collaborators. Most visible, however, is 
the appearance of spokes-agents. During the ongoing translating and enrolling that takes 
place as entities assemble and reassemble, there are always agents, human or non-human, 
who claim to represent the state-of-affairs. Spokes-agents are constantly at work 
delineating the groups or entities they claim to represent, and this often involves the 
active disparagement of other, potentially contradictory groups and entities that are said 
to be obsolete, erroneous or dangerous (Latour 2005: 31). During the interessement of 
the scallops, those larvae that anchored to the towline become spokes-agents for the 
entire species, and the three researchers, if successful in their translation and enrolment 
of scientific colleagues, have become spokes-agents for the scallops and the scientific 
community. Obviously maintaining a spokes-agent role requires a lot of work: alliances 
must be kept through constant translation, interessement and enrolling, and it is this 
constant activity that makes spokes-agents so visible.   
 By noting what form an entity is given, how interessement occurs and thus how 
spokes-agents are able to maintain alliances, we are able to trace the formation of 
assemblages as they occur.  We are, in other words, able to witness how it is that some 
actors go about populating the world and providing it with motion, while other potential 
associations and enactments, or capacities for interaction, go unrealised. And here we 
finally have a solution to the problem of quantity we keep encountering. Rather than 
attempting to include as many elements as possible in a sociological investigation, or 
prematurely assigning causality to particular types, the sociologist simply needs to follow 
the associations as they form and let the actors decide what elements are to be included.  
We may live in a messy complexity, but from this the constant assembling and 
reassembling of elements by various agents produces manageable pictures or accounts of 
the world. These pictures are often fickle, frequently disputed and very rarely become 
widespread. Uncovering how agents go about dealing with complexity by producing such 
accounts, and how some accounts may become more widespread than others, is the 
sociological task perused here.   
  
 Medical sociology can aim to uncover how various accounts of disease, the 
patient, pain, the body and so on, are produced; how it is that the complexity of the 
 30 
disease monad is dealt with through the assembling of actors and the culling from 
accounts of many other potential explanatory elements. The advantage of the 
metaphysics I have adopted here is that in tracing how these associations form, we are 
not restricted to any particular domain of practices. If need be, we can begin in the 
consultation room with the interactions between a GP and patient, move to the 
laboratory where centrifuges, cells, and microscopes subsist, pass through the world of 
corporate strategy and marketing campaigns and find ourselves back at the fleshy body 
of a patient. It is this agility that makes this approach so well suited to investigating 
contemporary medicine, which, as commentators have noted, appears to permeate so 
much of our understanding of ourselves and the world around us. Importantly, this 
approach requires us to be very specific in any investigation we may undertake. For 
instance, if medicine does indeed affect our conception of gender, what particular actors, 
whether they be individuals, instruments, molecules or ministries, associated to bring this 
affect about? And, how are these associations made durable so that this affect is 
maintained?   
 The strength of ANT lies in this specificity. In this project, my first aim is to 
uncover how an account of the body and symptoms is achieved within interactions 
between the patient and medical specialists and how this account is communicated. In 
other words, I am attempting to understand how it is that practices in medicine construct 
an account, and the techniques through which such an account may or may not be 
asserted as a reflection of “reality”.  By determining the moments of translation I will be 
able to note what actors are involved, how elements are encouraged to adopt the 
figuration imposed upon them, and how such associations are maintained. I will be able 
to determine whether or not, as has been suggested, medicine incorporates the 
biomedical model and rejects “social” explanatory elements, or whether the accounts 
produced are more nuanced than this, as has been suggested by Mol.  And, if social 
elements are culled from explanations of disease and conception of the body, how 
exactly is the biomedical model realised through practices: what actors and interessement 
devices insure that only somatic elements are included in accounts? Additionally, if 
conflicting accounts are produced, how are different renderings of a seminal element 
dealt with?   
 Ultimately, these are all questions concerning the techniques of power: the power 
to produce a knowledgeable entity, the power to restrict other renderings of an entity, 
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and the power that is the result of benefiting from a relatively durable set of associations.  
This brings us back to the three premises I outlined earlier on in this section. By 
accepting the heterogeneity of elements that constitute the social world and that the 
traditional micro and macro division of the social is fruitless, and by accepting that actors 
can come in any form, I have stated that we can uncover the specific associations that 
constitute power. Such an assertion requires further explanation. In the next section of 
this thesis, then, I will elaborate on what exactly it is I mean by the notion of power and 
therefore why it is such a vital concept of this project and to the sociology of medicine in 
general. To put it concisely, this project is essentially an exposition of what has been 
called biomedical power. My second aim, therefore, is to provide an account of power. 
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Notes on Power 
“Used, reused and endlessly abused”: power, as several commentators have aptly pointed 
out, has been thrown around so superfluously and with such imprecision in sociology 
that it risks becoming an empty concept (Law 1991: 165). Nevertheless, it is not 
surprising that it dominates much of the literature, as concerns over inequality between 
various groups have provided the discipline with much impetus since its birth. Social 
theorists have sought to make sense of those seemingly relentless, veiled forces that 
sanction domination. In these terms, “power” has often been broadly perceived as 
something possessed and shared by an elite; a zero-sum reservoir that could be used with 
discretion to compel the oppressed to work against their own interests. In recent years, 
this crude conception of power has largely been abandoned in favour of Foucault’s novel 
reworking of the concept (Westwood 2002: 19). Power is not simply a repressive force 
which we must overcome, or the barrier between enslavement and liberation; it is, rather, 
the very thing that constitutes us and produces us as a knowable subject. Consequently, 
to experience freedom is not to be outside of the relations of power, or to have 
overcome it, but to be engaged in the active arrogation of power for the purposes of self-
formation. Freedom, truth, fact, reality: these cannot be separated from power any more 
than ideology and hegemony (Foucault 1977: 27). Power is a productive force, diffuse 
and exercised from innumerable points, allowing us to talk about, rationalise and manage 
things.  
 Unfortunately, Foucault’s reworking of the concept can lead to some sloppy 
sociology. Power has become an explanans.  In seeking to explain why the world is the 
way it is, why some groups are more privileged than others, some social scientists have 
used power as a cause, as if it constitutes some potent energy on its own, without actually 
exposing the specific relations and the entities involved (Latour 1986: 265). This 
tendency is no doubt prompted by Foucault’s own constant phrasing of power as a 
productive force, but he also repeatedly states that it is an effect, constituted by specific 
relations between entities brought about by practices such as the confession, (1998: 62-
67) the practitioner’s gaze (2003: xiv), and various disciplinary techniques (1977: 170). In 
this brief section I will add to the numerous sociological considerations of power and 
make a case for Foucault’s rendition of the concept. But, in order to avoid using power 
as an explanans, I will suggest that by adhering to the prescriptions of ANT that I have 
outlined above, we can unravel the specific relations that constitute power as both a 
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productive and a repressive force. I will also suggest that if power is seen as an effect of 
relations between elements, then relations that have become durable can result in 
situations where domination may occur. 
 
So far we have seen that as associations form between elements, these elements become 
intelligible as their capacities for interaction are realised. Assemblages therefore construct 
the world, populating it with entities and providing it with actors. Is this not what 
Foucault refers to as the productive capacity of power?  
The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an “ideological” representation of society; but 
he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 
“discipline”…[P]ower produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production. (Foucault 1977: 194) 
We have also seen that the assembling of entities and the production of intelligibility 
involves the culling of many other potential explanatory elements from accounts. As a 
translation occurs and interessement practices entwine an entity in a particular 
assemblage, other potential forms of the entity risk becoming discounted, ignored, or 
elided.  An entity can be enacted by several assemblages and multiple, differing forms 
may exist — as Mol (2002) has shown in her ethnography of medical practices — but to 
be produced and delimited as a knowledgeable entity is to have a myriad of potentialities 
inhibited. The inevitable flip-side of a power that produces reality is restriction, or a 
degree of repression.  
 Multiple realities and differing forms of the same entity can exist and as Mol 
demonstrated, this is usually not problematic, particularly if the sites at which each form 
of the entity is enacted are kept separate (2002: 87). In some cases, however, unity is 
necessary. Within the hospital, a disease may have differing forms depending on which 
practices are enacting it, but it may be required that the “informed” patient is presented 
with a singular, coherent account of their affliction. Such an account is itself an 
achievement, the consequence of various practices of ordering and sorting, ranking and 
prioritising: a patient’s circulating medical record, a medical student’s textbooks, a health 
insurer’s documents or a ministerial briefing, which may all portray a disease as a unified, 
coherent affliction, are the result of such practices.  Mol outlines some of the means by 
which the messiness of hospital practices are dealt with. In some cases, where order and 
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coherence is necessary, one reality or one form of enactment wins. A hierarchy is 
established and some facts are accorded more weight than others, and in the hospital it is 
often the account produced by the laboratory or the specialist clinic that is granted as 
being more factual. In Mol’s example, a patient complains of considerable pain in the leg 
when walking — a common symptom of atherosclerosis in the lower limb. The patient is 
taken into the clinic, positioned on the examination table and inflatable cuffs are placed 
around the leg at specific points. The technician first inflates the cuffs, then deflates 
slowly, using a stethoscope to listen for the “popping” sound of blood as it bursts 
through the artificially constricted artery.  Secondly, the suspect leg is subject to 
ultrasound probing by a Doppler apparatus. The rate of reflection of the ultrasound 
waves can be used to determine the rate of blood flow and can uncover any possible 
hindrance. The technician makes a note of the numerical outputs of both procedures, 
carries out some calculations, and consequently declares that there is nothing wrong with 
the leg (Mol 2002: 61-62). The patient’s complaints become subjective, while the 
technician’s objective findings are duly noted on the medical record as reflecting the 
“truth” of the condition of the arteries. Mol notes that in this specific hospital, the 
hierarchy between laboratory findings and the patient’s feelings are institutionalised 
within the routine that stipulates that all clinical diseases must pass through the lab 
before therapeutic measures be considered (2002: 63). Despite the intensity of his 
feelings, the anxious, pained patient is excluded from a range of actions and resources: 
the assembling of a technician, cuffs, a stethoscope and a Doppler apparatus has 
produced a series of truths about the patient that have channelling, restrictive effects.  
By undergoing the tests, the patient has become entwined in a machinery 
saturated with laboratory instruments, highly drilled staff and routines with very specific 
stipulations about who or what can be a spokes-agent and thus grant access to a further 
network of practices, instruments and routines.  We must be aware that this machinery is 
never rigidly fixed; routines and spokes-agents can and do fluctuate, but nonetheless 
there is something durable about such assemblages, a degree of stability which tends to 
align particular elements in a certain way: the position of the cuffs on the patient’s leg; 
the way the stethoscope is held against the pulsating artery; the elaborate, carefully 
designed mechanisms that form the Doppler apparatus. The consequence of this 
durability is that a great deal of the reality that will be enacted has already been encoded 
within the pre-aligned elements. Particular capacities of interaction will always be 
realised, whereas others will simply be unaffected and will either go unnoticed or 
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ignored. Obviously this does not mean that a particular “positive’ or “negative” result 
has been predetermined, bur rather that certain elements will simply never be involved in 
the association. The Doppler apparatus, for instance, will convert ultrasound echo and 
time scale into a numerical value that represents internal spaces of the body, but its 
design makes no allowance for, say, the ethnicity or gender of the patient or indeed the 
patient’s anxieties or feelings. The fixed design of the internal elements of the apparatus 
insures that certain entities will always be culled from the account it produces. Certain 
capacities for interaction are therefore not realised. Herein lies the point of interest for 
the sociologist. Power is both productive and restrictive, and as associations can be 
durable, these productive and repressive effects are also encoded, prescribed, and 
therefore to a degree, fixed.   
 Foucault envisaged power as being exercised from innumerable points, which it 
no doubt often is: elements align and realign, actors and spokes-agents change. He is also 
said to have famously sullied the idea that power is something that can be possessed and 
used with discretion (May 2006: 82-85), but this is best understood as an injunction 
against simply reducing power to domination and the ability to exploit; a hindrance to 
liberation. Foucault’s conception of power as a productive effect of various relations was 
more nuanced than has often been portrayed and certainly does not preclude the 
possibility of situations where domination may occur: 
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes encounters what 
may be called situations or states of domination in which the power relations, instead of being 
mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remained blocked, 
frozen… In a great many cases power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually 
asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom. (Foucault 1996: 434, 441) 
Durable assemblages, such as the example above, are the source of perpetually 
asymmetrical power relations. When, for whatever reason, associations become less 
transitory, their effects, both productive and restrictive, become more unshakable: 
translations become more fixed and alternative, elided potential forms and the access to 
networks that may have followed, become more unrealisable, less tangible. The question 
is, ‘how is it that some associations gain durability?’ To construct a stable association 
would require strict regulation and coordination of the elements involved: objects would 
have to accept their translation and their actions would have to be foreseen. Who or 
what could have such foresight and omnipotence? Who can create a set of relations with 
enough durability to bring about some form of domination? In this respect, it is 
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engineers and designers who display such god-like abilities. The Doppler apparatus, for 
instance, is the consequence of a carefully managed alignment of metals and electric 
charges, arranged to have a very particular, predicted affect on air particles which are 
induced to oscillate at a desired frequency. This careful arrangement of elements is the 
consequence of years of scientific and designer trial and error, numerous attempts at 
translation and piles of mathematical calculation, and the result is a discrete little device, 
boxed-off to avoid as many unwelcomed external actors as possible, where all the 
elements act in symphonic precision to have a single, desired output. Technology is the 
closest thing to a frozen assemblage. Associations are tightly regulated so that predictable 
and calculable capacities for interaction of each of the constituent elements are enacted. 
And, if the technology or instrument is used as intended, then we can see that there will 
be some regularity to the accounts it produces. There is, to put it another way, durability 
in the way such technologies go about constructing reality.  
 The implications of this have been nicely demonstrated by Latour. As scientists 
go about discerning the nature of the world, they employ numerous instruments. 
Assemblages form and reform, technologies, scientific papers, lab technicians and other 
elements become entwined in the construction of facts. Latour notes that to have 
constructed or “discerned” a fact, is to have your claim tied to as many durable 
associations as possible.  An account that has been established as a reflection of reality is 
an account that has been brought about by associations that are difficult to sever, that are 
the consequence of successfully translated elements (Latour 1987: 78). We can use Mol’s 
example as an illustration. Let us say that the patient disagreed with the account 
produced by the technician and her various instruments and calculations and maintained 
that he did indeed have atherosclerosis in the lower limb. How will he go about 
convincing others, particularly his GP, that the laboratory account was wrong?  He could 
do so by attempting to argue that the procedures and instruments he was subjected to 
were a waste of time and could not possibly speak truths about the condition of his 
arteries. To make this argument with any weight, he would have to question the 
engineering and scientific principles behind the Doppler apparatus, yet the challenge for 
the patient is that these scientific principles have been fortified by a vast collection of 
scientific papers, textbooks and probably most of the scientific community who have 
incorporated these “facts” into their own practices. These papers and practices would 
themselves be fortified by numerous instruments and other “facts”, such as knowledge 
concerning the nature of particle oscillation which, in turn, are the consequence of 
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numerous other practices, “facts” and instruments. The dissenting patient is confronted 
with what turns out to be a vast connection of well-established associations and 
translations that trail-off in all directions (Latour 1987: 74-79). The technician, her 
procedures and the Doppler apparatus are well connected, durable, and thus factual. The 
patient, by comparison, is unconnected, alone and his account of his leg is rendered 
subjective. Of course, alternative accounts can both exist without having to undergo such 
trials of strength, especially if they take place in quite distinct locations; but when one 
account must be chosen over the other, it is those that benefit from durability that will 
win-out. 
 As a strict coordination of entities, tightly regulated and controlled, technology is 
one means by which agents from the past or from different locations can act on the 
local, present-day coordinating of elements. Early 20th century physicists and Swiss 
biomedical engineers have their own understanding of the world incorporated into a 
device such as the Doppler apparatus, which may then play a pivotal role in the 
enactment of a patient’s body. Reality, as ethnographers point out, may be constructed 
and negotiated in an everyday local context again and again, but many of the important 
actors may be operating from vast spatial and temporal distances (Latour 2005: 200). 
Technology is essentially a vehicle for distant actors to act in the immediate space; 
encoded within technology are the beliefs and concerns of scientists and designers 
which, through the strict alignment of elements within instruments, have a predicted, 
desired influence on the production of local, immediate accounts. We can see here how 
technologies can bring about the repetition of similar accounts or realities, again and 
again. Whenever a particular technology is employed, its fixed nature ensures that the 
same capacities of interaction are being realised: the same range of elements are always 
culled from any account produced, and the type of elements that are included (and those 
that the instrument has been rendered sensitive to) are those that the designers have 
decided are essential. 
 Obviously the repetition of particular accounts and realities will only occur if the 
technology or instrument in question is used “correctly”.  If the instrument is not used as 
the designer intended, then the designer’s beliefs and concerns that are encoded within it 
are muted. For the Doppler apparatus to produce the intended type of account of a 
patient’s arteries, it must be used by a technician who is both highly knowledgeable about 
the spaces of the leg and well-trained in using the device: the Minister of Health would 
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be as hopeless with the Doppler apparatus as a monkey with a violin. It is for this reason 
that instruments are often accompanied by instructive documents and “drilled people” 
(Law 1986: 255).  For a technology to have an intended effect it must itself be carefully 
coordinated and aligned with often numerous other elements. This causes no end of 
headache for designers. Humans are arguably the most unruly and difficult to regulate of 
elements as they are forever sensitive to the actions of an enormous quantity of actors 
operating from all sorts of locations: somatic, local and global, historic and present. 
Consequently they have a tendency to engage in what Latour refers to as 
antiprogrammatic practices: actions that contravene what has been expected of them 
(1992: 261).  In an attempt to coordinate human interaction with newly developed 
technologies, commercial institutions often spend a great deal of resources on predicting 
human behaviour and uncovering common antiprogrammatic practices. Findings from 
such research may be incorporated into an instruction manual or the design of the device 
in order to make it more user-friendly. The goal is to create competent users whose 
interactions with a technology can be predicted and regulated, so that the designer’s 
understanding of the world is expressed through its operation in producing a particular 
set of effects or accounts. In this sense it seems naive to talk about technology or a 
particular instrument as having any effect on its own: it must always be part of a much 
wider machinery where various elements and actors mutually constitute one another 
(Prout 1996): the Doppler apparatus, its designers, the trained technician and the 
patient’s arteries are constituted as such through their transient alignment.  
 We may have a carefully designed technology, but if it is not accompanied by 
trained personnel or at least an accessible instruction manual, then it will fail to generate 
the intended outcome.  We are therefore far from being dominated by instruments and 
their inherent capacity for reproducing similar accounts, or the engineers that design 
them. And as Madeleine Akrich has shown in her case studies, even when technology has 
been successfully coordinated within a network of machines, skills and social relations, 
something as minute as a cotton-eating bug can quickly unravel the entire assemblage 
(Akrich 1989, cited de Laet and Mol 2000: 226). But despite the fragility and transient 
nature of assemblages, some are more durable than others. If an instrument is operated 
by highly trained personnel, coordinating as intended with other instruments also 
operated by trained personnel, and if these operating and coordinating practices are 
institutionalised in a set of protocols within a highly regulated physical context, then 
there will be regularity in terms of how this entire machinery affects other elements and 
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the type of accounts that will be produced. This is why modern medicine is so exciting 
for the sociologist. It is characterised by large numbers of highly trained, specialised 
personnel, numerous instruments from the basic scalpel to the very complex MRI 
Technology, circulating medical records, test results and instructional documents, 
procedures and protocols, all assembling and reassembling in a relatively controlled 
physical context. As Mol has shown us in her work, protocols are seldom strictly 
followed: numerous assemblages may produce alternative accounts and trained personnel 
do not necessarily always act in a predictable manner, but modern medicine is 
nonetheless comprised of assemblages that do acquire a degree of durability, precisely 
because it is saturated with technology and trained personnel. The trained technician will 
use the Doppler apparatus in the same fashion on all patients suspected of having an 
atherosclerotic leg, and as a consequence, the same capacities for interaction are realised 
and the same type of account is produced time and time again. The designer’s or 
engineer’s understandings of what are the essential elements in an explanation therefore 
prefigure the reality that is enacted. And because these technologies are associated with a 
pantheon of other interconnected technologies, scientific beliefs, textbooks and 
practices, the enacted realities acquire an objective weight in the face of any attempted 
dissension.  Modern medicine is a machinery of elements, seldom in accordance with one 
another, but nonetheless potentially dominating in that its relations gain rigidity from 
being encased in the material components of instruments and in the procedures of highly 
trained, specialised staff.   
 Importantly for the sociologist, what is unique about medicine is that this 
machinery comes into intimate contact with the bodies and body-parts of patients.  As 
we have seen with the patient in Mol’s example of the Doppler apparatus, the patient is 
placed in a highly ordered environment and has a very particular set of practices carried 
out on his leg.  His leg is enacted in a particular way, certain capacities are realised, and 
an account is produced. We could ask: how much involvement did the patient have in 
this account?  It was his leg and he would have to give consent for the procedure, but the 
result is the enactment of a healthy, fleshy artery that is, in effect, separate to the patient’s 
anxieties, pains and understanding of himself, and it is this enactment which is asserted 
as being a reflection of reality.  A reality has been produced by an assemblage, and the 
consequence is that the patient is restricted from a set of procedures and treatments that 
would otherwise have been available should the diagnosis have come back positive.  
Patients can demand to be “informed” and they are granted the right to deny treatments, 
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but within the relations of the medical machinery there is often a very limited margin of 
freedom. A patient can always attempt to reject their enacted form, and in many 
contexts, outside this hospital, this may be unproblematic. But within the hospital certain 
avenues of action will be closed-off while others, for better or worse, will be imposed 
upon them. And it is often the case that the medical translations are not just medical. 
Diagnosis of particular pathologies, especially those concerned with mental health, carry 
weight outside the hospital by being inscribed in legal codes, and a positive diagnosis can 
severely restrict an individual’s room for mobility in other areas of their life. We can see 
here that medical practices can come to resemble situations that Foucault refers to as 
“perpetually asymmetrical” (1996: 441), where the relations brought about by various 
medical practices have a severally restrictive impact on that which has been translated. 
The individual lacks the time and resources to challenge the technology and procedures 
involved in their enactment, and their translation is re-enacted in numerous contexts. 
 What makes medicine such an exciting terrain for sociologists is that this 
machinery, potentially asymmetrical in its various, sometimes conflicting operations, can 
affect those things usually deemed “social”: gender, sexuality, subjectivities, social groups 
and so on.  The so-called “medicalisation” of various aspects of human life has 
understandably become the focus of considerable study in the social sciences. Of interest 
in more recent times is how a new knowledge of genetics and molecular biology has led 
to new ways of self-understanding and governance (Rose 2001). This has led to the 
spawning of numerous bio-buzz words: bioeconomics and biovalue (Waldby 2000), 
biopiracy (Pottage 1998; Strathern 1999); biorisk and biosociality (Rabinow 1996), all of 
which reflect social scientist’s recognition that knowledge produced in the lab or medical 
clinic often has major implications for the way individuals identify and manage 
themselves and interact with others. Foucault’s notion of biopower is often used to make 
sense of this. Biopower, according to Foucault, refers to the technique of governance of 
the modern state, where populations are governed through various practices that 
subjugate bodies (Foucault 1998: 141-143). The practices of medicine and science lend 
themselves to this form of governance by producing a body that is equated with a life 
that must be “maximized” through self-surveillance and self-management. Governance 
therefore involves promoting individual self-responsibility, and “freedom” is understood 
in these terms. Much of this interesting work on biopower does appear to provide a 
coherent explanation of the interrelationship between liberal governance, bodies and 
medicine, but it is often problematic.  It tends to overstate the domination of medicine 
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by assuming that the categories, terms and narratives of science and medicine are naively 
adopted by an eager population of individuals.  There is very little elaboration on the 
specific relations that might bring these effects about, and any material relations are often 
dismissed in favor of discursive or “social” forces.  Medicine is rendered as something of 
a leviathan, the source of new knowledge, categories and subjectivities that risk spreading 
throughout the modern world with the momentum of an epidemic. As a consequence, 
many of the actors involved in the relations that constitute biopower are completely 
overlooked, and so are the numerous cases where medical categories and diagnoses are 
contradicted, are treated as irrelevant or are out-rightly discarded in favour of other 
means of self-identification (for an example of this, see Callon and Rabeharisoa 2004). 
 If instead we see power as the effect of relations between elements, then we can 
avoid these pitfalls.  To possess the capacity to produce or repress, as John Law puts it, is 
to enjoy the effects of a stable network of relations (1991: 166).  In order to comprehend 
power it is therefore necessary to understand how networks come about and recognize 
that these relations are heterogeneous: they can be material, such as the alignment of 
elements in the Doppler apparatus, legal, social and so on. By adhering to the ANT 
principles outlined above, we can follow relations as they form, note how entities are 
endowed with various figurations and reveal how it is that some relations and 
translations gain a degree of durability. Firstly, this approach has the benefit of drawing 
our attention to the numerous instances within the medical machinery where ontology is 
multiple. As we have seen in Mol’s ethnography of medical practices, an entity’s form is 
not bounded or fixed; it is fluid and multiple forms do not necessarily lead to confusion 
or conflict. And secondly, this approach will allow us to understand, when conflict 
between forms does occur, how it is that one account or translation is asserted over 
others. In other words, the strength of the method I am adopting for this project is that 
it reveals how a relationship between various elements is brought about, how this 
relationship can produce an account or a reality, and how the reality produced may have 
restrictive or repressive effects. And in terms of comprehending power, this is a method 
well suited to exposing relations that have become fixed in such a way that they result in 
a perpetually limited margin of freedom for particular actors.  As we have seen, it is 
necessary to recognize the important role of technology in bringing about durable or 
fixed relations.  It has the capacity to bring about similar accounts again and again, and 
because instruments are often interconnected with numerous other technologies, 
practices and documents, the accounts they produce are often equated with objectivity.  
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It is this recognition that such material relations and non-human actors are often vital 
components in bringing about those “social” effects that makes ANT so well suited to 
the study of technology-laden medicine, and from a theoretical point of view, it provides 
an excellent foundation for understanding how power can be both productive and 
repressive, and how, in some cases, it constitutes a relation of domination.  
 
 
A Restatement of Points: Associating with the Data 
After our lengthy elaboration on the ontology of ANT and the relations of power it is 
useful to restate the key points. The primary aim of this project is to understand how it is 
that medical practices go about producing accounts from monadic complexity: how it is 
that some elements are brought into medical ontology while many others are ignored, 
disregarded or elided. I will be focusing specifically on the practices involved in the 
diagnosis of a particular patient. My intention, then, is to uncover how a particular 
diagnosis is achieved, and how this is asserted as being “objective”, or a “true” reflection 
about the state of the world. In order to provide some analytical coherence to this 
undertaking, I will roughly adhere to the following points provided by Callon (1986): 
• Translation. Translation occurs when an entity is said to have a set of qualities and 
it is granted a particular form. Here we are searching for points where the 
diagnosis is explicitly defined, perhaps in a written document, an illustration or 
via conversation. The diagnosis is based on particular qualities that the body or 
body-part is said to have and which are therefore treated as reflections of its real 
nature.  
• Actor Identification. The qualities that an entity is said to have are brought about 
through associations with other elements.  A diagnosis is therefore made through 
the realization of particular capacities of interaction within the body or body-part, 
and these capacities of interaction are realized through the interaction of 
associating elements or actors.  It is important to note not only what form the 
body or body part is granted but also how the associating actors bring this about. 
At this point we will be mapping the immediate assemblage involved in the 
enactment of the body or body-part. 
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• Interessement: The formation of an assemblage and the construction of knowledge 
from complexity involves the culling of many other possible explanatory 
elements from the accounts produced. Interessement is the group of actions 
which prevent other potential forms of the entity from being realized and 
consequently stabilize the intended translation. These group of actions often 
involve the use of material devices which have the effect of reducing the 
likelihood of alternative assemblages forming which would result in the 
realization of different capacities of interaction and thus a different enactment of 
the body or body-part. Here, then, we are searching for those instances where the 
patient is situated in such a way that there is marginal room for alternative ways 
of making sense of their body or body-part. 
• Enrolment: In order for the translation of an entity to have any consequences, 
other actors must also be convinced of the qualities that have been attributed to 
it.  More entities must become associated if the assemblage is to construct any 
meaningful information about the world and avoid becoming insignificant. We 
must therefore note how it is that other actors, both human and non-human, 
become convinced of the diagnosis and thus enrolled in the translation.  It is 
through these resulting alliances and interconnections that the diagnosis acquires 
“objective” status and is asserted as a true statement about the nature of the 
world. 
• Spokes-Agents: During the formation of assemblages, certain actors are constantly 
at work delineating the groups or entities they claim to represent, often actively 
deriding other, potentially contradictory groups or entities that provide 
alternative accounts.  Spokes-agents, like all actors, can be either human or non-
human. Here we will be identifying those elements that claim to represent the 
real nature of the body or body-part during the diagnosis and are therefore 
actively engaged in delineating the patient and their illness.  
These points provided by Callon will not necessarily represent distinct, separate 
operations: it is quite possible that translation, interessement and enrolment might be 
brought about by a single spokes-agent at a single instance. These simply provide a rough 
guide enabling us to makes sense of the constant assembling and reassembling of 
elements by drawing our attention to specific instances where action brings about the 
formation of knowledgeable entities. Following Mol (2002), I will make extensive use of 
 44 
the term enact. The advantage of this word is that it conveys something of the temporality 
of translations.  Unlike “construction”, which tends to suggest the creation of something 
that becomes stable and fixed, “enactment” alludes to the potential fragility of the form 
that an entity is endowed with. An entity can acquire a meaningful form in a particular 
time and place, but this may soon be disregarded, ignored, forgotten or superseded by 
another enactment.     
 What we are effectively producing is a map of medical practices as they populate 
a world; a map of an assemblage as it enacts a reality. The map that we create cannot 
possibly articulate the near-infinite amount of detail that characterizes all phenomena, 
but if we hope to avoid prematurely assigning causation, we must nevertheless attempt to 
explicate all those points of translation that are essential to the assemblage we are 
following. As McGrail puts it, a good ANT map will always be stubbornly situated: 
“performing its terrain well for some purpose without becoming a general model waiting 
to swallow up distant settings or implying undue relevance to ‘Cleopatra’s nose’3 by 
blindly following actors” (McGrail 2005: 129). Drawing attention to the points of 
translation, and the practices of interessement, enrolment and the activities of spokes-
agents should insure that our map of the medical practices involved in a diagnosis is 
sufficiently detailed while remaining void of unnecessary, banal detail.  
 There are some general statements that I wish to deduce from this map, 
however, concerning the nature of power. Once we have traced our assemblage, we will 
have an illustration of how relations between elements produce a reality, how this 
production can have channeling, restrictive effects, and we may also have an illustration 
of how relations become durable so that they “allow an extremely limited margin of 
freedom”. I am hoping, then, to show that power is an effect of various relations 
between elements, and not a force on its own, an explanans for social phenomena. There 
is a political motive to this. This project is essentially a description of how others go 
about constructing and negotiating a reality, how facts are deciphered from non-facts and 
how one account comes to be viewed as more objective or truthful than others. If we 
can expose some of the techniques through which this happens, then we are well placed 
to impede relations that constitute domination, should there be an ethical or political 
                                                
3
 Marc Antony was said to be so transfixed by a marble bust of Cleopatra that he was tragically 
late for the decisive battle of Actium. Pascal argued that had Cleopatra’s nose been smaller, the 
battle would not have been lost, and western history would have unfolded otherwise. 
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imperative to do so. To put this succinctly, if we have an understanding of how 
domination can occur, then we are obviously better suited to undertaking effective 
counteraction. 
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2 – Medicine in Action 
 
 
 
In mapping our assemblages we will be following a patient on a foray through the 
healthcare system. Fortunately for the patient and us, this does not require the awkward 
presence of a sociologist in the consultation room, taking rushed and clumsy notes. This 
work has been delegated to a much more reliable and less invasive set of actors, video 
and audio recorders, which have been set-up by a research nurse in locations where the 
interaction between the patient and medical specialists/instrumentations took place.  Our 
patient, Simon, began his venture with a consultation with his GP, who then referred 
him to a specialist to undergo further testing. This has generated three distinct sets of 
video and audio data, each corresponding to a different location where action took place: 
the GP consultation (location 1), the test (location 2), and the debrief with the specialist 
(location 3). Following suit, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first two 
sections deal with what are effectively two discrete sets of practices enacting two discrete 
accounts, while the third deals with an attempt to coordinate these accounts. 
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 In location 1, we will be tracing the elements involved in the enactment of pain. I 
will show, following Mol (2002: 23-27), that it is through interaction between the GP, the 
patient, and various other elements that pain acquires a coherent form. In location 2, we 
will watch the patient as he is assembled amongst a series of instruments, resulting in the 
construction of an inscription device which produces an account of the internal spaces of 
the patient’s body. The construction of this inscription device and the subsequent 
account is the result of the careful alignment of elements brought about by a medical 
technician and a specialist. In location 3, we will witness an attempt by both the specialist 
and patient to make sense of the inconsistency between the account of pain produced in 
location 1 with the account of the internal spaces of the body produced in location 2.  
These accounts are potentially conflicting, and two tactics are used by the specialist to 
provide a sense of coherence. Firstly, he provides an alternative explanation for the pain 
which is consistent with both accounts, and secondly, he questions the reliability of the 
inscriptions device and therefore the account of the internal spaces of the body. No final, 
absolute diagnosis is made, however.  I will argue that as a result of this, in location 3 we 
have the enactment of an indefinite, vague reality: a body part that is most likely healthy 
but still a cause for concern.  
 It is necessary here to give a brief explanation of my method of analysis.  Firstly, 
video recordings of each of the three interactions were observed several times, and 
points where translations occurred were noted. Transcripts of these points were then 
examined, noting which elements were brought into the production of accounts, and 
which actors were involved.  These were then checked again with the video recordings to 
insure that all necessary actors and elements had been identified, particularly those that 
may not have been expressed in verbal conversation. Excerpts of the transcripts have 
been provided throughout the following sections. I have made very minor changes to 
these excerpts to improve readability.  All video data and transcripts were prepared by 
the ARCH research team. 
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Section 1: Enacting Pain 
 
Location 1 is the setting for the patient’s primary consultation with his GP. The room is 
much like any consultation room: the GP’s desk is against the wall, upon which sits a 
computer, some medical reference books, a couple of ring binders and some paper notes; 
two chairs for patients are next to the desk; alongside is an instrument for measuring 
blood pressure; and on the other side of the small room is a narrow bed with a pillow. 
This arrangement allows the GP to swivel easily from facing his patient to his desk and 
computer. Our patient, Simon, is concerned about pain that he has been feeling in his 
chest. Our consultation begins with Simon taking off his jacket, and taking a seat. He and 
the GP then begin to discuss the pains he has been experiencing. The result of this 
discussion, as we shall soon see, is the enactment of chest pain: Simon’s chest pain 
becomes a coherent entity with a set of particular qualities, and as a consequence of this, 
it becomes an actor in-itself. Before we begin, however, it is worth having a brief 
overview of pain as an item of sociological study in order to provide some theoretical 
context for the following discussion.   
 
A Sociology of Pain 
No doubt it seems unusual to suggest that it is through interaction that pain becomes an 
entity: surely the physical pains of the body can exist and be felt regardless of any 
attempt to articulate them and certainly prior to engaging in any medical practices. These 
points are not being denied by claiming that pain is enacted in the consultation room. 
What I am suggesting is that during the consultation process, the bodily-sensations 
experienced by the patient must be communicated to the GP in some form or another, 
and this requires the construction of an account by employing various explanatory 
elements. The patient is by no means the sole creator of this account, as the type of 
explanatory elements used will depend a great deal on the questioning and investigative 
techniques of the GP. It is through interaction, therefore, that bodily-sensations become 
something that can be talked-about, and thus something that is the basis for further 
action, and it is in this respect that it becomes an entity that it was not before.   
 In characteristic fashion, social scientists have chastised medicine for reducing 
pain to a series of neurophysiological events, ignoring any sociological and 
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phenomenological factors (see, for instance, Bendelow and Williams 1995). Yet, if we 
look at Mol’s work, pain in the consultation room is often understood in terms of social 
considerations: the inability to walk certain distances, or the inability to climb four flights 
of stairs to a daughter’s apartment (2002: 14, 22). It is from these sorts of details that 
pain becomes a coherent entity, and upon which decisions about treatment plans are 
made. It is certainly not limited to a series of somatic events and there is room, then, for 
accounts of pain to take a range of forms by including a variety of explanatory elements.   
 A nice example of the composite, indefinite nature of pain is illustrated in 
Nettleton’s historical overview of dentistry. Within dental practice and literature, the 
meaning of pain has changed, corresponding to changes in what Nettleton refers to as 
the “spatial locations” in which the objects of dental practice reside (1992: 65). Prior to 
the Great War, pain simply did not exist: dentists were trained to manipulate the mouth 
without regard for the feelings of the patient (1992: 66). By the mid 1930s, however, the 
“feeling” patient emerged. The object of dentistry was now an individual with a body and 
mind, and dental practice altered significantly to reduce or avoid pain. Pain was 
conceived as a physiological problem, located firmly in the fleshy body of the patient 
(1992: 66). After the Second World War, dental practice began to include social aspects 
in definitions of pain and fear: disease and pain were not simply phenomena of the flesh, 
they had “subjective conditions” which were the product of “genetic, familial and 
environmental background” (1992: 68). As Nettleton puts it, “dentists were made aware 
that they were treating humans, and not just teeth” (1992: 71), and dentists were told that 
the success or failure of a treatment may depend more on the rapport they had with the 
patient rather than on their technical proficiency (Nettleton 1992: 71). By the late 1950s, 
dental practices were centred first on discerning the nature of pain and then on its 
elimination. Dentists were instructed to systematize their practice with a series of 
standardised questions for patients, concerning: the exact location of the pain; the 
presence of any other accompanying symptoms; the character of the pain (ache, dull, and 
so on); if there was anything associated with the pain, such as high or low temperatures 
or eating particular foods; and finally on the duration of the pain (1992: 72).  
 Pain went from being something invisible or inconsequential in dentistry, to 
something that existed in the fleshy body and to be avoided in successful dentistry. By 
the 1960s, pain was the object of considerable attention when consulting with patients. 
As Nettleton states, as dental practices changed, so did the attributes of pain. It was both 
the concern and the product of practices, aimed at discerning the nature of, and the 
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elimination of pain (1992: 65). In effect, as dentistry progressed, a space for pain to exist 
as an entity opened-up, and the specific explanatory elements that could be used in an 
account expanded from almost nothing at all, to physical causes and to eating habits. 
Although Nettleton’s genealogical approach differs from the approach being used here, it 
does illustrate some of my points. Firstly, as we have seen, pain as an entity in the 
consultation can potentially take a range of forms. Two patients may experience similar 
bodily sensations, but if the interactive practices within their consultations differ 
markedly, then so may the pain that is enacted: the elements brought into an account are 
by no means determined by the patient alone. Secondly, as a consequence of this, the 
nature or explanatory elements brought into an account are often heterogeneous. Making 
sense-of pain is not limited to neurophysiological causes and eating food, life-histories 
and visiting the daughter can be valid explanatory elements, particularly in a profession 
that aims to treat the patient as a human as well as a body.   
 Keeping these points in mind will aid us in the pursuit of tracing the enactment 
of Simon’s chest pain. Our intention is to note what elements, whether they are somatic, 
social, psychological and so on, are brought into the account of pain, and what practices 
bring this about. To reintroduce the terms defined in the previous chapter, it is via 
elements or associating actors that chest pain is translated, acquiring an intelligible form. In 
the process of identifying the practices involved in the enactment of chest pain, we will 
be noting the spokes-agents, those actors that are constantly delimiting the elements and 
the attributes of pain as they are defined.  
Before we begin with our consultation, it is necessary to reiterate a 
methodological precondition. It is tempting to treat pain as a symptom, the result of 
physical events in the body, and as something which subsequently has implications in 
terms of how the patient can then carry-out their normal day-to-day activities. This 
would allow us to divide our elements into the physical causes of pain (the “disease”), 
and the social and psychological repercussions of having pain (the “illness”).  But if we 
do this, we are prematurely granting pain with a form, rather than tracing how pain is 
given form in practice, and thus rather than looking at how others go about enacting 
worlds, we would be jumping ahead and constructing a world for them. It is necessary, 
therefore, to discard any prior assumptions about what sort of elements should be 
granted that status as “cause” and which should be relegated to the status of 
“implications”. If any such division is made, it will be the result of the explicit sorting 
and ranking practices of spokes-agents, which we will be able to trace. In this section, 
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then, we will focus solely on the translating activities of actors and refrain from imposing 
any prior assumptions about the nature of pain. We must approach the consultation with 
as much impartiality as an anthropologist studying an unknown community and let the 
practices of the participants reveal their unique world. By adhering to this “follow the 
actors” approach, we will see how it is that pain is actually articulated in the consultation 
and how it is that understandings are negotiated, order is produced and thus how further 
actions come about. 
 
 
The Consultation 
1 - Interactive construction 
 
We have a patient, Simon, and a GP. Before the interaction begins, we can assume 
nothing else about what actors will come into play and what entities will be revealed. No 
doubt both Simon and the GP enter the consultation with a vast set of their own 
assumptions about the nature of the pain, disease, illness, and the body, and with a set of 
understandings about how the consultation should be conducted, but unless these 
assumptions and understandings are revealed in practice, they are of no concern to us. A 
large part of the action within the consultation takes place via conversation between 
Simon and the GP, and it is through this verbal interaction that many of the explanatory 
elements are brought into the account of pain. As the conversation takes place, things 
that exist outside the consultation room, or things that may have occurred sometime ago, 
are brought to bear on the immediate assembling of entities involved in the enactment of 
pain.   
 Initially, most of the talking is done by Simon as he explains his pain to the GP. 
He begins by qualifying the pain as a “tightness across the chest”, and then goes on to 
provide further detail:  
 
Simon:  At times when I’m under stress I get this tightness across my chest and it’s quite 
 uncomfortable. It is slightly complicated by the fact that about three weeks ago I was going  to 
 shift a fridge. But I didn’t notice any, like, I had damaged myself, but I wondered at that stage 
 whether I had kind of pulled some muscles… In fact, just this last night I woke up in the 
 middle of the night and was angsting about something and it felt kinda tight and uncomfortable 
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 and its not shooting pains or anything. It tends to move around a bit, but probably 
 tends to be this side [Simon places his hand on the right side of chest].   
 
This is the account that Simon gives of his pain prior to any major leading or questioning 
by the GP. We can see that an assortment of elements is brought into the account: the 
shifting of a fridge, pulled muscles, stress and anxiety, broken sleep. Some of these 
elements are somatic, others are clearly not. Simon obviously associates the painful 
sensation with feelings of anxiety and stress, but it is also linked to physical exertion and 
the pulling of muscles: it has both psychological and physical associations. The pain is 
granted a rough location: the chest, predominantly towards the right, but it does move 
around. And it has also been described as a certain type of sensation: “tightness”, rather 
than “shooting”.  Already with Simon’s preliminarily rendering of his pain, we have an 
entity that is becoming intelligible as it is granted attributes. Yet, aside from suggesting a 
couple of reasons for the pain, he has by no means made a firm assertion concerning its 
cause, and it still remains a vague, hazy entity. It is not formless, but it does not yet have 
any solid form.  
 Up until three minutes into the consultation, the GP has said very little and as a 
result has contributed very little to the account of chest pain that has so far been 
produced. This changes as he begins to ask a series of questions in order to further 
discern the nature of the pain: 
 
GP: Going back to your family history is there anything you think we need to know about? 
 
Simon: Mum had heart attacks. It would have been at probably a similar age to me. My Father lived 
 till eighty five or six. It wasn’t a heart problem for him. 
 
GP: Okay. Between last time you saw a doctor almost a year ago, you have had some other 
 episodes as well. 
 
Simon: Yeah, yeah. It could have been maybe two or three in that period of time.  
 
GP: What about with exertion and exercise, any problems there?  
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Simon: No. Well, I don’t get a lot of that [exercise], no more than walking or going down my 
 steps. I don’t run or anything. My ankles are knackered, I can’t run anymore.  
 
GP: Okay. Associated with the discomfort, is there anything else like nausea or feeling of your 
 heart beating fast, or sweating? 
 
Simon: No, none of that. It’s just discomfort. 
 
GP:  Any discomfort spreading to the right arm, or into the neck and throat area? 
 
Simon: No.  
 
We can see here that with this succinct line of questioning, a range of new elements have 
been introduced.  Firstly, family history is brought into the interaction and Simon’s pain 
acquires a genealogical component. An association is made between Simon’s pain and his 
Mother’s troublesome heart. Secondly, the pain acquires a frequency of occurrence: 
between two and three times in the last year. Thirdly, the pain has been understood in 
terms of exercise. Although, according to Simon, the pain does not occur during exercise 
(which in his case is no more than walking or using his steps), exercise has become an 
explanatory element; a means by which pain is made sense of, and it has therefore 
become part of the account. The same can be said regarding the feeling of nausea, the 
sensation of a fast-beating heart, sweating, and pain in the arm and neck: Simon’s pain is 
made sense of in terms of the explicitly stated absence of these elements.  
 Simon’s pain, then, is acquiring more form. As more associations are made, and 
more entities are brought into the account, the more intelligible it becomes: it has some 
qualities, it lacks others. It has location, it occurs in the chest, not the arm or the neck. 
But it is not restricted to Simon’s body, as it also potentially exists as a familial 
phenomenon, in the body of his mother. It has tentatively taken on a hereditary 
dimension. It has also acquired a temporal dimension, and can be understood as 
something that occurs, or has occurred, with a certain frequency: It has been situated in 
time. And, it is understood as something that is not linked with several other bodily 
sensations.   
 It is clear here that the pain enacted in the consultation, the pain that is 
intelligible, is the consequence of interactions which involve local, shared negotiations. 
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Obviously the form that pain takes depends not only on how Simon articulates his bodily 
sensations but also on the specific questions asked by the GP, and these questions both 
reflect and enact an understanding about what particular capacities of chest pain should 
be enacted or made known. We can assume, then, that the GP’s questions reflect his 
understanding of chest pain-as-a-symptom and its possible causes, where family history, 
nausea and spreading pain are considered essential indicators of a pain’s underlying 
cause. 
 It is worth pointing out here that there is a degree of shared understanding 
between Simon and the GP.  The first question put forward by the GP; “Going back to 
your family, is there anything you think we need to know?” could, in another context, 
lead to an enormous number of responses. Yet, in this consultation, Simon has 
understood this question as something along the lines of “does your family have a history 
of heart problems?”, and has responded with: “Mum had heart attacks, it would have 
been at a similar age to me.” The GP assumed that Simon would understand this 
question as referring to a history of heart problems, just as Simon assumed that this is 
what the GP meant.  As a consequence of the tacit understanding, “The heart” and 
“family history”, which were both absent from Simon’s initial account of his pain, have 
promptly been added as explanatory elements.    
 At this stage it is clear that both Simon and the GP are major actors in the 
enactment of pain as a knowable entity. Both are involved in bringing certain elements 
into the account while leaving others out. While the GP is directing which type of 
elements are to be included through his line of questioning, Simon has been generating 
associations both in his responses to these questions and in his initial rendition of his 
pain. We can employ some of our ANT terminology here and say that both these actors 
are involved in translating chest pain, from a bodily sensation into a clinical entity. In this 
case, chest pain as a clinical entity is composite: it involves heterogeneous explanatory 
elements, from shifting fridges and broken sleep, to hereditary heart problems and an 
absence of nausea. Borrowing one of Mol’s terms, this chest pain is very much  a 
“patchwork singularity” (2002: 70): It is being discussed as if it is a singular, discernable 
entity, yet it is being patched together using elements that are somatic, social and 
psychological.    
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2 — Fluid translations 
 
This patchwork entity is by no means yet fixed. As the consultation progresses, we will 
notice that some of the explanatory elements are foregrounded as being potentially more 
explanatory of the pain, while others escape further mention. The translation of chest 
pain, then, is ongoing.  What we do find, however, is that the entity, as it has so far been 
translated, has become the basis for further action. It has become intelligible enough that 
decisions can be made about what avenues of action should be taken, and in this sense it 
has become an actor-in-itself: it is not yet fixed, or rigid, but it has attributes, and these 
attributes are sufficient grounds for bringing about a further set of associations.   
 
GP: Obviously, the pain, we worry about it. You worry about whether it is coming from the 
 heart and obviously that’s the important thing to rule out because some people only get so 
 many warnings. So, slip your sleeve up there. [Here the GP begins to check Simon’s blood 
 pressure.] What  I think we need to look at doing regardless of what I find, the chances are the 
 examination will be normal, is to send you off to run on a treadmill for a while, wired up to an 
 ECG and do a stress ECG, which is a cheap and easy test to do and which has a pretty good 
 pick up rate for a heart that’s not getting as much oxygen as it wants. ..Yeah you’re right, your 
 blood pressure is always good, similar level to what it was last year. Now, you’re a non smoker. 
 Have you always been a non-smoker? 
 
Simon: Nah, I stopped, oh it’s been a while ago, it would have been early eighties when I stopped. 
 
GP: Okay. Were you a heavy sort of pack a day man? How long would it have been for? 
 
Simon: Yeah. All of my adult life at that point really. 
 
GP: Slip your shirt off and I will have a listen to your chest. 
 
Simon: One of my colleagues at work suffered from a cardiac last week, and had an advanced 
 heart rate. It kind-of brings it to the consciousness a bit. 
 
A new set of elements has been introduced. The GP has introduced an association 
between chest pain and smoking, and smoking has been made sense of in terms of 
 56 
quantity of cigarettes smoked, and duration of smoking. Aside from this, we see the 
foregrounding of the “heart:” and “cardiac” as explanatory elements.  The GP states that 
the heart is the “important thing”, and it is therefore necessary to undergo a treadmill 
test in order to determine “if the heart is not getting as much oxygen as it wants”. 
“Oxygen”, and a “heart-that-requires-a-certain-amount-of-oxygen”, have become 
explanatory elements.   
 As a consequence of this translation of chest pain, a series of further actions are 
undertaken, each involving the assembling of new, mostly material elements and the 
enactment of new entities in the consultation. Simon’s blood pressure is measured, for 
instance. An inflatable cuff, attached to a manometer, is fitted to Simon’s arm at a 
specific location, inflated and then slowly deflated by the GP who, using a carefully 
placed stethoscope, listens for the characteristic popping sound of blood as it passes 
through the artery. The result of this careful alignment is the generation of a couple of 
numbers which represent the systolic and diastolic blood pressure. Here, elements are 
brought together, particular capacities of the body and equipment are enacted, and 
“blood pressure” is rendered as a couple of meaningful numbers. The value of these 
numbers allows the GP to remark that Simon’s blood pressure is “good”, and the actual 
numerical values are noted in the medical notes which we will come to soon. Similarly, 
the GP “listens” to Simon’s chest. Again he uses a stethoscope, and again a careful 
alignment of elements results in the enacting of particular capacities within Simon’s 
chest, resulting in the production of meaningful information. Each of these practices 
brings a new series of elements into alignment and brings new, intelligible entities into 
the consultation. Obviously the capacities that can be enacted by such assemblages are 
pre-figured by the fixed, designed nature of the apparatuses used and their careful 
alignment, coordinated by the GP, with Simon’s body.  We will come back to this point 
in section two.  
 The “cardiac” and “heart-that-requires-a-certain-amount-of-oxygen” link that has 
been established with Simon’s chest pain also brings about two further courses of action. 
These take place outside of the current consultation.  The first, as noted above, is the 
treadmill ECG test, which is the subject of section 2 of this chapter.  The second is 
initiated as follows:  
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GP: It is probably worth doing a blood test. We have this test called Troponin T, which is 
 helpful. It’s a chemical which is released from unhappy heart muscle cells, basically if 
 they’re a bit under stress. It rises dramatically in heart attacks.  
 
A blood test is suggested, and in the process we have the introduction of more 
explanatory elements: “Tropinin T”, and “unhappy-heart-muscle-cells”. The results of 
this test are, at a later time, recorded on the GP’s medical notes. 
 
 We can see here, then, how chest pain is constructed as an intelligible entity and 
subsequently becomes the basis of further action. Through interaction between the GP 
and Simon, various elements have been assembled to produce an account of chest pain.  
As we have seen, this chest pain is composite, as it includes a range of heterogeneous 
explanatory elements. And it is certainly not fixed, more associations are made, some 
associations are foregrounded and emphasized, and others seem to fade into the 
background: the translation, then, is ongoing. But, despite this lack of solidity, chest pain 
has acquired enough attributes (often only through tentative links) to instigate particular 
courses of action, each of which involve the assembling of material elements and the 
production of more intelligible entities. In this consultation, then, we have a snap-shot of 
world-building. Action is bringing about the enactment of entities, which then bring 
about further action: an order of things, not fixed or definite, but nonetheless utilizable, 
is being created, assembled, and employed.  
 
 
3 — Probability as intelligibility 
 
So far we have seen the foregrounding of the “cardiac”, and “heart” elements of Simon’s 
chest pain, and how this has led to the treadmill ECG stress test and the Tropinin T test, 
and the measurement of Simon’s blood pressure. The GP, however, then goes on to 
make a tentative diagnosis: 
 
GP: If I were a betting man I would put my money on the fact that this certainly is not heart 
 related. I suspect it’s coming from the chest wall but I can’t be a hundred percent sure and  I 
 think it is such a straight-forward test to do. 
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Simon: The treadmill one? 
 
GP: Yeah yeah.  I do think we should look at doing it because there is a chance; the past 
 history of smoking, the family history, we need to take those into account. 
 
\Here, an unhappy heart is not being foregrounded as the most probable cause of the 
chest pain, but rather as an unlikely, but highly dangerous probability that requires 
exploration. This probability, although minor, is the consequence of the “smoking” and 
the “mum had heart attack” links to Simon’s chest pain that had been made earlier, and, 
according to the GP, are sufficient grounds for further testing.  As the most likely causal 
element for the pain, the GP introduces the “chest wall”.  
 It is worth commenting here on the GP’s strategy during this consultation. 
Simon, in his initial rendering of his pain, makes no mention of his heart, his family 
history of smoking, or family history of heart problems. These explanatory elements, as 
we have seen, were quickly introduced with the GP’s line of questioning, while many of 
the elements that Simon put forward, such as “angsting”, “stress” “pulled some muscles”   
have so far been ignored. The GP’s primary strategy, as he puts in his own words, has 
been to “worry about whether it (the pain) is coming from the heart… that’s the 
important thing to rule out”. No doubt this concern for the heart, and the line of 
questioning used to discern the probability of the heart as a cause, is a reflection of his 
training and previous experiences, and we have seen how Simon’s chest pain has been 
made intelligible as a consequence of this concern.  The result, as we see above, is that 
the chest pain that has been enacted is not fixed or absolute, but composite, fluid, and as 
potentially dangerous: it is intelligible in terms of probabilities and risk, and as something 
that therefore requires further exploration. 
  
 
4 — The product of differing concerns  
 
Once this tentative diagnosis has been made and several courses of action have been 
decided upon, the consultation continues with Simon elaborating on his earlier account 
of his chest pain.   
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Simon: But I think my depression rate is getting worse.  [A close relative] died a couple of years ago, 
 I don’t know if I mention that, and yeah, other complicating factors, my son’s finally left 
 home and I can’t quite get over that – I think probably there’s more episodes [chest 
 pain] these days. So I guess I sort of angst about things more than I used to. 
 
GP: Do you get to the point where you get broken sleep regularly or affects your appetite?  
 
Simon: Nah, never affects my appetite. It can affect sleep, certainly. 
 
GP:  Any kind of life isn’t worth living type thoughts? 
 
Simon: No no no. Just more about, you know, kind of self worth and your place in the history of 
 things, what you’ve done in your life and maybe the fact that I’m coming up 60 and you tend 
 to look back over what’s been a bit of a rocky road. Yeah, so, I don’t know if that’s got 
 anything to do with it.  
 
Simon leads the consultation away from talk about the “heart” and reintroduces some of 
the elements that appeared in his initial account, notably “angsting”. The death of a 
relative, his son leaving home, worries about self-worth, have also been brought in to the 
interaction: Simon has directed the consultation towards a new set of social and 
psychological concerns that he thinks may have something to do with the “episodes” of 
chest pain. Again, some sets of elements are being foregrounded while others, this time 
heart related, move into the background. And again the GP responds with a series of 
direct questions, bringing “appetite” and “sleep” and “life isn’t worth living thoughts” 
into the interaction. The GP goes on to state that: 
 
GP: Yeah yeah. Well, this may be relevant to what’s going on [chest pain] of course. Two 
 thoughts come to mind, one is whether medication will be helpful and the other is whether some 
 kind of counselling would be helpful. 
And later: 
 
GP:  I guess from what you have said it is probably more, as you say, that kind of existential sort 
 of stuff [that is causing this], and as well the sort of grieving stuff you are working 
 through. 
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Here we have moved towards an enactment of chest pain as being caused by feelings of 
anxiety and stress and worry. Again, the language the GP has used reiterates that this 
diagnosis is only tentative.   
 At this point, it is worth briefly retracing the consultation. We began with 
Simon’s, initial account, which included links to “angsting”, “moving fridges” and 
“pulled muscles”. The GP responded by directing questions towards the heart, family 
history, and then towards smoking. From this, chest pain was constructed as something 
that may be heart related, and based on this, a series of tests were initiated. Simon then 
directed the interaction, as we have just seen, back to psychological elements: “angsting” 
was foregrounded, as was “stress”, “self-worth” and “depression”. The enactment of 
chest pain in the consultation is the product of interaction between two principal actors, 
Simon and the GP, but it should be noted that each actor appears to have had different 
concerns. Aside from Simon’s comment about his work colleague who “suffered a 
cardiac”, he has not initiated any verbal links with his chest pain and the “heart”. These 
links have all been initiated by the GP. The GP, on the other hand, has played a very 
minor role in introducing psychological elements; this has largely been directed by 
Simon. The different concerns no doubt reflect the different experiences of the two 
actors, and in the case of the GP, institutionalised training. We could say that both actors 
have been moved or affected by varying sets of other actors to focus on particular 
associations by asking certain questions and viewing some elements as more explanatory 
than others. And these different concerns do not, as we have seen, lead to any explicit 
disputes concerning the nature of pain, but rather contribute to constructing a chest pain 
that is composite and fluid as different associations are foregrounded and others fade 
away.  
  
 
5 — Consolidation 
 
So we have seen that within the consultation, interaction has generated a composite, 
indefinite chest pain, intelligible in terms of probabilities and risk. And we have seen how 
this enactment of chest pain has led to a series of actions, each involving a new assembly 
of elements and the enactment of more intelligible entities.  But what happens when the 
interaction between the two principal actors ends, when the negotiations and assembling 
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ceases, does this chest pain have any sort of existence as an intelligible entity outside the 
consultation? In our case, some of the details of the interaction have been recorded by 
the GP in his medical notes, and it is this record that provides ongoing durability to 
Simon’s chest pain outside of the clinic. These notes, then, effectively represent the final 
translation, a consolidation of the chest pain that has so far lacked solidity. As a written 
document, the explanatory elements presented within it are fixed, and are not subject to 
the ongoing foregrounding and fading that we saw taking place during conversation: the 
ongoing, moulding translation of the interaction is therefore rendered as something that 
is fixed and stable within the GP’s notes. Below is a summary of the GP’s notes. In order 
to provide as much anonymity to the patient as possible, I have replaced some of the 
specific details with more general information.  
 
Medical Notes 
 Presents today with a further episode of chest pain up to 45 min in duration at 0400 
 woke. No assoc. nausea/sweats and no radiation to arm and neck. Minor niggles also 
 between last year’s episodes and today. No external pains noted: tho only walks these 
 days. No SOB arrhythmia noted. Note: fam hx – mother developed IHD late 50s. 
 Smoked 20/d for approx 20 y. from 20-40. Admits some stress & mood upsets which he 
 thinks may relate to son leaving home. Also, upcoming anniversary of death of close relative. 
 Troponin T and blood pressure are normal.    
  
It is important to note how the events of the consultation have been recorded, 
particularly which elements have been included and which have been discarded. This will 
give us some indication of which explanatory elements explored in the consultation are 
viewed by the GP to be essential to Simon’s chest pain.  As we can see in the notes 
above, this fixed translation of chest pain is still composite in that it incorporates 
elements that are somatic, social and psychological: Troponin T, the mother’s 
troublesome heart, the absence of pain in the neck and arm, the duration of pain, broken 
sleep, smoking, the son leaving home, stress, and the death of a loved one have all been 
included in the notes as potentially essential to understanding the chest pain. Here we 
see, then, the product of both the GP’s concise line of questioning that led to the 
inclusion of the smoking and family history elements, and Simon’s account, which 
includes references to his son, and the recent death of a relative. What we don’t see 
however, are references to pulled muscles, shifting the fridge, appetite or the chest wall.  
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Some elements have been culled, and others have been consolidated within the written 
account, and the GP, who creates this written account and has the ability to amend them 
at a future date, is a spokes-agent for the chest pain. 
 The importance of these types of notes and records is that they allow the 
consolidated entities of the consultation to act across temporal and spatial distances. The 
record presented above, for instance, will be consulted in the future and the information 
contained within it may become the basis for more action. Records and notes are often 
circulated to other locations, and in this case, the notes were forwarded by the GP to the 
cardiac specialist responsible for conducting the treadmill stress test that we will be 
following in the next section. Consequently, Simon’s chest pain, and Simon-as-a-patient 
attain an intelligibility that extends through time and escape the immediate location in 
which they were originally constructed. The translation, then, becomes durable and 
mobile.  
 
   
6 — Multiple preoccupations 
 
Before we move on to the next section, there is a point that needs to be addressed. 
During the consultation, several preoccupations were made explicit by the GP that had 
some bearing on what courses of action were followed. These are considerations that 
were taken into account by the GP when deciding which tests should be conducted, and 
that were not directly related to the chest pain that was being enacted in the consultation: 
 
GP: We send you off to run on a treadmill for a while, wired up to an ECG and do a stress  test, 
 which is a cheap and easy test to do and which has a pretty good pick up rate… 
 
And further on: 
 
GP: You don’t have any health insurance that covers specialist stuff?  
 
Simon: Yeah I’ve got health insurance. I think it covers specialist stuff. 
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GP: Do you want to check and get back to me? If its one of those policies that just covers 
 surgery it may not cover specialist procedures. But if it does cover specialist procedures then we 
 can whip you up to the clinic and get it (the treadmill stress test) done at your convenience.  
 
Decisions about what action to take are not based solely on the form of the chest pain. 
Here we can see that the GP reveals other considerations that were taken into account 
when deciding upon the treadmill stress tests as a further course of action, notably: the 
cost of the test (“cheap”), and the efficacy of the test (“it has a pretty good pick up 
rate”). Financing the test is also revealed to be a factor considered by the GP. Whether 
Simon has adequate private health insurance determines if he will be “whipped-up” to 
the clinic at his convenience, or alternatively, shunted into the public system.  
 Latour and Woolgar have noted that scientific practices are often laden with such 
preoccupations, which consequently influence assembling practices within the laboratory 
and the resulting construction of facts (1986: 154-159) In our case, via the GP, factors 
such as cost and finances, and test efficacy, are brought to bear on the assembling of 
elements within medical practices. These preoccupations cannot, therefore, be divorced 
from the enactment of entities: they influence decisions about what practices are to be 
conducted, and thus what elements are to be brought into accounts. They are, in this 
sense, actors that come to have an affect via the activities of the GP and medical 
ontology, therefore, is the product of juggling these various considerations.  
 
 
In this section we have followed the interactive enactment of chest pain as an intelligible 
entity. We have seen how the translation of this entity is ongoing within the consultation, 
as some explanatory elements are foregrounded and others fade, and we have seen how, 
along with preoccupations introduced by the GP, this entity has become the basis for 
further action.  This entity then acquires a degree of solidity and mobility by being 
inscribed in a written record that can traverse both spatial and temporal distances. A 
great deal of the action within this consultation has taken place via verbal 
communication. Elements have been assembled, associations have been made and 
entities have been made intelligible largely through the verbal interaction between Simon 
and the GP.  In the next section, we will be focusing on material interaction: the 
treadmill stress test. This is largely coordinated by verbal interaction, but as we will see, 
the production of intelligibility is brought about via material associations. This will 
 64 
provide us with a glimpse at another means by which ontology is constructed in 
medicine.  
 
 
Section 2: Enacting the Heart 
The treadmill stress test is conducted at a specialist clinic several weeks after the GP 
consultation.  As we have seen, although the GP doubts that Simon’s chest pain is 
caused by heart troubles, he does state that Simon’s history of smoking, and his family 
history of heart problems, presents enough risk to warrant further testing, and the 
treadmill stress test is  “cheap and easy”, with a “pretty good pick-up rate” for heart 
troubles. Before the actual test begins, Simon has a consultation with the cardiologist 
responsible for conducting the procedure. It is worth briefly outlining this consultation 
as several new elements are brought into the explanation of chest pain that are also 
linked directly to the treadmill stress test.  
 This interaction takes place in the cardiologist’s consultation room, a large room 
with a bulky desk placed between the cardiologist and the patient. The discussion centres 
on the nature of Simon’s chest pain and the purpose of the treadmill stress test. The 
cardiologist begins by asking Simon a series of questions about his pain, most of which 
are similar to the questions put forward by the GP that we have just seen.  From Simon’s 
responses, his chest pain is enacted as: not being associated with sweating and nausea; is 
located in the centre of his chest and does not move to the neck area; is not exercise 
related, may be related to a family history of heart pains; may be related to a history of 
smoking, and is not associated with any breathlessness. Some new elements, however, 
are added to the explanation, notably alcohol and diet. The cardiologist directs the 
discussion of chest pain towards alcohol consumption and the type of foods Simon 
usually eats, specifically the quantities of dairy, trim red meat, skinless chicken, fish, and 
whether olive oil or cream is used as a base for pasta sauces.  Consequently chest pain is 
associated with the consumption, or lack of consumption, of particular foods.  Towards 
the end of the consultation, the cardiologist explains the purpose of the treadmill test 
and, as we will see, several important elements are brought into the account of chest 
pain. 
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Cardiologist:  The heart’s a muscle pump and it has three arteries that supplies blood… and what 
  we are trying to do is see if there is any chance you have got a narrowing or a blockage 
  to one of those three arteries that is restricting the blood flow down the artery to the 
  muscle beyond, so that when you stress the heart it doesn’t get the blood it needs and 
  you get angina, you get chest tightness. Now in some respects it sounds like it could be 
  angina, but in others, mainly that it is not regularly occurring with exertion, it doesn’t 
  sound like angina. So what we are going to do is head down to the treadmill and we 
  will get you wired up and we will check things over and then I’m afraid I’m going to 
  crack the whip and we are going to stress the heart and see if you get any chest pains, if 
  we see any ECG changes to indicate there is a problem and we will really go from there 
  depending on what we find… So, shall we adjourn to the treadmill room?  
 
The cardiologist provides an explicit link between the pain, the heart and its arteries, and 
the treadmill stress test. The heart is explained as something that causes angina when it 
fails to receive enough blood due to narrowing of the arteries, and this causes tightness 
across the chest, or chest pain, and can be identified by the ECG stress test. Here, the 
heart, blockages, arteries and angina have been brought in as explanatory elements, and a 
problematic heart has been rendered as something that can be made visible by the testing 
apparatus. The cardiologist, then, has provided angina as a possible basis for the chest 
pain while outlining the function of the treadmill stress test.  
 Simon moves on to the treadmill room. It is here, as we will see, that a largely 
material assemblage is constructed, where Simon’s body becomes entwined in a medical 
technology aimed at producing an account of the inner spaces of his body.  Before we 
follow this construction process, it is worth reviewing some of the sociological writing 
on the relationship between the body, technology and medicine, as this will provide some 
useful points for discussion, as well as providing a context for this approach.  
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A Sociology of Techno-bodies 
 
A great deal of theorising on the relationship between medicine and the body has been 
motivated by Foucault’s archaeology of medical practice, The Birth of the Clinic (1973).  
Here he contrasts two epistemes of medical thought.  Pre-19th century medicine is 
characterised by what he calls the “primary spatialisation of disease”, where the essence 
of disease was said to exist in the realm of ideality: disease in its ideal form was foreign to 
the body, but it would manifest as a bodily lesion; a shadowy, less pure, less truthful 
replica. Understanding and treating disease thus required making it “transparent to the 
exercise of the mind” (Foucault 2003: xiv) and the physician’s tool was his capacity for 
rational contemplation, along with a set of elaborate tables and charts of lesion typology.  
At the end of the 18th century, something of an epistemological revolution occurred. 
There was a fundamental change, Foucault argues, in the relationship between the visible 
(the bodily lesion) and the invisible (the cause of the lesion). Bodily lesions were framed 
as the signs of processes within the body, processes which were the disease itself.  With 
this secondary spatialisation of medicine, understanding disease requires peering into the 
fleshy compartments of the body, noting its forms, colours, textures, and searching for 
the most finite, most minute, irreducible source of the ailment: this is the potentially 
visible essence of the disease (Foucault 2003: 9-13). Disease, then, became embodied, 
and the eye of the physician became the “depository and source of clarity, it had the 
power to bring truth to light” (Foucault 2003: xiv) The eye, the physician’s unprejudiced 
gaze, became the means of producing intelligible relationships between bodies, body 
parts, cells and germs. 
 Foucault argues that this new episteme was part of a wider movement in western 
metaphysics towards producing individuals-as-subjects. The individual emerged, not 
simply as a theological or aesthetic concern, but as the focus of various institutional, 
practices; modes of inquiry into an individual that labours, an individual that speaks, and 
an individual that is a product of natural history or biology (Rabinow 1991: 8-9). In 
medicine, the reorganisation of knowledge brought about by the medical gaze led to the 
emergence of an individual who, as the source of disease, acquired the status of an 
object. The body became a bounded assortment of interacting tissues, functional organs 
with colours, textures and cell-types; and an understanding of not only disease, but also 
the processes of life itself, was to be found within this bounded, fleshy, tangible and 
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visible mass. Life and death were rendered as biological processes that, with a rational 
mind and an empirical method, could be explained and potentially controlled.  
 In more recent times, the ongoing search for the processes of disease has led to 
what Nikolas Rose refers to as the molecularisation of life (2007: 5). Here, the human 
genome is envisaged as being the basis for not only many diseases, but more importantly, 
the most minute, irreducible foundation of life. Particular genes or chromosomal 
arrangements, for instance, are said to be the cause of ailments that manifest as physical 
or mental states deemed to be abnormalities.  Rose argues that this molecularisation of 
life may have major repercussions for life in the twenty-first century.  As particular 
diseases are reduced to their genetic basis, the possibility of new forms of subjectivities 
or relations between groups arises: people are made aware of their particular genetic 
make-up and their resulting susceptibility to particular diseases, and are encouraged to 
adjust their day-to-day activities accordingly (Rose 2007: 6). Already we are seeing the 
rise of support groups based on particular genetic illnesses, which seek to share 
experiences among members, instruct members on how to manage their affliction, lobby 
for funding into research as well as promote an awareness of the disease (see Rabinow 
1996). The spaces of the body, then, become a source of self-understanding and a basis 
for self-management practices. 
 Obviously, these new means of self-identification and group-formation could not 
have occurred without a pantheon of new technologies that have allowed the inner-
depths of the body to be made visible.  Advances in medical technology have been 
encouraged by, and have facilitated, the medical gaze and the imperative to delve into the 
body. From the beginning of the twentieth century, numerous new instruments have 
been devised to make the internal, organic spaces of the body visible. X-rays, for 
instance, produced images of denser organic spaces without the need for invasive 
exploration, as did ultrasound, mammograms, and more recently, PET and fMRI scans 
(Rose 2007: 14). At the molecular level, the development of the X-ray crystallography, 
mass-spectrometry, electrophoresis techniques and electron scanning microscopes 
provided visible renditions of particles too small to reflect the electromagnetic radiation 
necessary to be detected by the human eye. Such technologies have enabled the body, 
and the spaces within the body, to become intelligible and amenable to thought and 
medical management. 
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 Yet it is not a case of visualisation technologies simply providing a window into 
the body, through which the unprejudiced medical gaze can peer upon the inner forms as 
they naturally reside.  As Bernike Pasveer has shown in her history of the development 
of X-ray imaging in medicine (1989), a great deal of ongoing work and manipulation goes 
into producing an arrangement that generates intelligible information about the body.  
When nascent radiography was first applied to the body at the very end of the 19th 
century, no meaningful images could be produced.  At the time, there was no readily 
available medical knowledge which could be used to assess these first radiographs 
(Pasveer 1989: 363). Because of this, it was not known what a meaningful image would 
actually look like, and consequently it was impossible to make any distinction between 
images of spaces within the body and intrusive, visual noise. In order to generate some 
idea about how radiology could be used and how the streaks and shadows of the 
radiogram could be interpreted, images were compared to autopsied cadavers and other 
diagnostic information, and experiments were carried out on the various shadows cast by 
parts of the body.  All this took place as radiography became a specialised profession, 
leading to a greater homogeneity of instruments, methods and therefore the types of 
images produced.  Pasveer’s example illustrates the large amount of work necessary to 
produce intelligible images of the body. The images alone were not enough to represent 
the world. A reservoir of knowledge was needed concerning the spaces of the body and 
the way these spaces interact with electromagnetic radiation, which could then be used to 
develop and modify the radiograph equipment until it produced the type of images that 
were expected. Only after years of autopsies, experiments and adjustments, and the 
standardisation of techniques brought about by professionalisation, could X-ray imaging 
be equated with the objective, unprejudiced medical gaze, and the internal spaces of the 
body as rendered by radiography could be equated with a reality. 
 Donna Haraway makes this point in Situated Knowledges (1991). She talks of the 
instruments of visualisation in our current technology-laden world, where everything 
from minute particles, such as proteins and DNA, to huge but distant cosmic 
phenomena, are reduced to images that are visible to the naked eye (1991: 188-189).  
Such particles and phenomena are not, in fact, naturally visible to the naked eye: they are 
either too small to reflect electromagnetic radiation, or, in the case of very large, distant 
objects, the reflected radiation is too minute to be detected. The production of 
intelligible images thus requires a great deal of work: particles are bombarded with other 
particles, reflections are magnified and converted using complex algorithms, and colours 
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are artificially enhanced. The consequence is a collection of pictures of just about 
everything. These come to stand on their own as representations of reality as the 
instruments and work that went into their production are elided, ignored and bracketed-
off from discussion. Haraway argues that we are left with what appears to be a God’s eye 
view, or a detached, objective representation of entities, giving the impression of a great, 
singular, visual unity to a world that is rendered as transcending the very agents that 
constructed it (1991: 189). This is particularly the case with images and knowledge of the 
internal spaces of the body. DNA, proteins, cells, organs and tissues are rendered as 
elements in a transcendental and indubitable, natural order of things.  
 But if we pay attention to the great deal of work that goes in to producing such 
intelligibility, Haraway argues, we recognise that there is no such thing as passive vision 
and there are no unmediated accounts. All perception is actively engaging in specific 
ways of seeing immense variation. To put this in the terms we have been using earlier, all 
knowledge production requires selecting some elements (those deemed to be significant), 
while ignoring or culling many other potential elements. This is what technologies, 
particularly visualisation technologies such as radiography do: they ignore some elements, 
transform others, and produce seemingly stable accounts or representations of reality. 
How they go about registering and transforming elements while culling many others is 
the result of years of trial and error, modification and standardisation, all involving a 
range of actors juggling viewpoints, interests and beliefs. By recognising this and 
foregrounding technology and practices, Haraway argues that the knowledge that is 
produced as a result will lose its status as the single true reflection of reality. Other 
perception systems and means of creating knowledge of the body will be acknowledged, 
as will the partial, never-finished, “non-isomorphic” nature of identity and subjectivity 
that arises from such knowledge.  
 Thus, the re-spatialisation of disease and life within the spaces of the body 
described by Foucault has brought about a body-as-object. Numerous technologies have 
been developed to delve into the spaces of the body, and as Rose has noted, this has led 
to the molecularisation of life and new means of self-understanding and self-
management. Medicine and biomedicine have encouraged the production of new 
technologies aimed at making the internal spaces of the body visible, and as a 
consequence of this, the body-as-object, the fleshy body that has within it the truths of 
life and death, has become entwined in a plethora of technologies. The body in medicine 
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is swabbed, jabbed, probed, injected, sliced, stitched, magnified, tapped, bombarded with 
waves of radiation, exercised and so on, by carefully arranged assortments of 
instruments, in an attempt to make the spaces within the body intelligible. Pasveer and 
Haraway have illustrated that this knowledge does not simply represent a partial, “God’s 
eye” view. It is, rather, the consequence of practices that place technologies into an 
intimate association with bodies and body parts, practices that are often elided or ignored 
giving the impression that such bodily-entities exist as part of an a priori, singular reality 
that has merely been made visible.   
 Accordingly, and not unsurprisingly from the ANT perspective, how we make 
sense of the body is an effect of the assemblage in which it is embedded. Indeed, to even 
conceive of the body as being something discrete, with particular qualities, capacities and 
boundaries, is the product of assembling and disassembling practices. Latour uses the 
example of the training of “noses” in the perfume industry to illustrate this point (2004). 
Individuals are taught to recognise particular aromas through the use of an odour kit 
containing a series of fragrances. Some are sharply distinct and provide the individual 
with the ability to register major contrasts. Over time and with some training, more 
subtle differences between fragrances can subsequently be recognised.  Someone who 
once lacked the ability to recognise and discern smells thus acquires the ability to register 
a range of new aromatic elements: they now inhabit a “richly differentiated odoriferous 
world” and acquire a sensitive, much more effect-uated nose (Latour 2004: 206-207). For 
the nose to become a sensitive apparatus, something that could be affected by these 
odours, it had to assemble with the kit, and the elements of the training session. It was 
the product of an assemblage, as was the new world that it created. The kit is coextensive 
with the body; without it, the nose would have remained insensitive, dumb. As Latour 
puts it, to be made aware of our body, to feel it and to talk about it, we need associate 
with other entities, made to be moved, affected, and thus become sensitive. Our body, 
then, is an interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected 
by more and more elements: “acquiring a body is thus a progressive enterprise that 
produces at once a sensory medium and a sensitive world” (Latour 2004: 207).   
  
With these points in mind, it is perhaps more expedient to refer to techno-bodies. A 
body on its own is insensitive, it is not made to move and it is not affected. We might say 
that it is dead. A body that is aware, that is made to move by a rich, stimulating 
 71 
environment, is one that is, and has been, well associated with other elements, somatic 
and non-somatic. To be embodied, to experience bodily sensations and register the 
environment, is to have a hybrid-body: a body intimately coexisting with its 
surroundings. In medicine, which has become saturated with technologies, we might call 
this a techno-body. Furthermore, if assembling with non-somatic entities is necessary for 
the body to become sensitive to its environment, and if such assemblages are necessary 
for making the body and its parts intelligible as an entity, then we should refrain from 
making any a priori distinctions between a body and its non-organic surroundings.  
 This proscription underlies our method in this section. We will be following how 
it is that an account of Simon’s heart is produced during the treadmill stress test, noting 
which actors are involved in the production of this account, and which elements are 
brought into the explanation. Importantly, as has been made clear throughout this 
project, these actors and elements may take any form: they may be human or non-
human, material or discursive. Indeed, we will see that as Simon undergoes the treadmill 
stress test, the boundary between his body and the ECG instrumentation breaks down. 
We have, then, a techno-body which produces an account of the heart.  From a wider 
sociological perspective, by foregrounding the practices used to produce this account, we 
will be witnessing how it is that the medical gaze, or “God’s eye” operates; the 
techniques through which the internal spaces of the body are made visible, and how it is 
that these spaces become amenable to medical management.  To put this differently, we 
will be uncovering how the body becomes intelligible through its interaction with 
medical technologies and how, as a result, the spaces of the body can become a basis for 
self-understanding and therefore self-management.  
 
 
The Treadmill Stress Test 
1 – Aligning the elements.   
The testing room contains a narrow bed for the patient, the ECG equipment and 
instrumentation for measuring blood pressure, and placed in the centre of the room, 
taking up a great deal of space, is a large, bulky treadmill.  Simon sits on the bed while 
being prepared for the test by a medical technician.  
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 Simon has been instructed to remove his shirt and the technician begins to swab 
parts of his upper torso with alcohol. This, she states, cleans the skin to insure the 
electrodes make “good contact”. She attaches, one-by-one, ten electrodes to Simon’s 
torso, each at specific locations: one is placed either side of the centre of the chest, and 
five more are attached towards his left side, arranged in a curve towards the armpit; two 
are attached to the front side of each shoulder, another just above the belly-button, and 
the remaining electrode is placed to the left of the abdomen.   
 
Technician: Electrodes are now attached. So, you have been experiencing some chest discomfort. 
  Shortness of breath?  
 
Simon:  None of that, no, just feeling tightness in the chest area. Discomfort, really.   
 
Technician: So, once we have hooked you up to the computer, we will give the specialist a call. He 
  will put the blood pressure cuff on you and take your blood pressure and have a chat to 
  you and get the test underway. The treadmill starts off quite slow on a slight incline 
  and it increases every three minutes. If we find that your heart rate isn’t increasing fast 
  enough we’ll just accelerate the protocol and go a little bit faster. Have you walked on a 
  treadmill before? 
  
Simon:  No 
 
Technician: There are a few things to remember when you are walking on a treadmill. One is to 
  keep your toes at the front when you’re walking. Now, could I ask you to just stand 
  there on the carpet for me? I’m just going to pop this belt on… and that’s not too  
  tight? 
 
Simon:   No, that’s fine. 
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The belt that has been put around Simon’s waist contains a series of wires which the 
technician attaches to the electrodes.  
 
Technician: So if you would like to come and stand on the treadmill for me. So as I was saying 
  before, when you walk on the treadmill just try and stay nice and close to the front. Just 
  try and only use this bar here for balance. Try not to grip too tightly. The main thing is 
  to feel like you are walking on a normal flat surface. 
 
Simon:  Okay, fine. 
 
Technician:  So I will just enter your details here [on the computer].  
 
At this stage, Simon is standing on the treadmill with wires attached to the electrodes on 
his torso which, via his belt, are attached to the ECG device. The Technician calls the 
cardiologist, informing him that the test is ready to begin. The cardiologist enters the test 
room, places the blood pressure cuff around Simon’s arm, and takes a measurement.  
 
Technician: Excellent. So I’m just going to start the treadmill there Simon. Nice long steps. 
 
Cardiologist: Just longer steps and slower steps. There, that’s good. And maybe move a bit closer to 
  the front. Nice and slow and steady. 
 
After a minute the speed of the treadmill is increased and Simon’s strides become 
quicker. 
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Cardiologist: We’re going to go a little bit faster. Slightly longer steps there, just feet forward at the 
  front. Slower, longer steps. Just relax, help the ECG tracing. So how are you feeling, 
  alright?    
 
Simon:  Alright.  
 
After another minute, the treadmill speed is increased again.  The cardiologist is standing 
next to the treadmill and takes another measurement of Simon’s blood pressure, while 
the technician appears to be making notes on the ECG printout towards the side of the 
testing room.  Another two minutes pass and the treadmill speed is increased for a third 
time. By this stage, Simon is noticeably breathless and producing a sweat.  
 
Cardiologist: So are you right for another, about probably forty five seconds? 
 
Simon:  Yep. 
 
Cardiologist: Just let me know if you feel you can’t cope. Just come a little bit closer to the front. 
  About fifteen seconds and you will be able to have a seat… Ten seconds to go…  
  Okay. Just stay there. 
 
At this point, the treadmill is stopped and the cardiologist places a chair on the treadmill 
for Simon to sit on.  
 
Cardiologist: Okay, how you doing? Chest pain or chest tightness? 
 
Simon:  Nothing.  
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 We can see from this that the setting-up and conducting of the test is a matter of 
physically aligning various objects. Firstly, the electrodes are attached at very particular 
locations on Simon’s body. These locations are the standardised electrode placement 
points, as prescribed by cardiology and medical manuals, and are said to be ideal for 
detecting electrical activity in particular parts of the heart. The electrodes, then, are being 
aligned with objects within the body: the electrical impulses that trigger heart function. 
Secondly, Simon aligns his body with the treadmill. This interaction is closely monitored 
and coached by the technician and cardiologist. Simon is instructed to feel like he is 
“walking on a flat surface”, keeping his strides long and slow, with toes reaching towards 
the front of the treadmill. The pace of his strides is controlled by the speed of the 
treadmill and the duration of the test is determined by the cardiologist and technician. 
The co-ordination of Simon’s body, and thus how it aligns with the treadmill, is therefore 
regulated. Thirdly, the various components of the ECG device are aligned. The wires are 
attached to the electrodes, and these are subsequently connected to the print-out 
machine which records the ECG data.  
 The alignment of these objects during the test, or elements as we will now call 
them, brings about the material assemblage that enacts the heart. The careful placement 
of these elements regulates which other elements will be included in the assemblage; it 
insures that no unwanted, unpredictable, or unaccounted objects have an effect on the 
assemblage. For example, the technician informs Simon that the alcohol swab will “clean 
the skin” and insure the electrodes “make good contact”. Cleaning the skin is a matter of 
removing any particles that might interfere with the registering of electrical impulses by 
the electrodes. Particles may interfere with the capacity of the ECG equipment to detect 
heart function, producing an incomprehensible or misleading result. Carefully placing 
and aligning the elements, then, is a protection against noise; it is an attempt to silence as 
much complexity as possible and allow only a few elements to act and thus produce an 
intelligible signal.  The treadmill stress test, as a regulated alignment of elements, is a 
means of insuring that certain other elements within the body, the electrical impulses of 
the heart, can be deciphered, while many other elements are left silent through their 
deliberate or unintentional but necessary exclusion. 
 It should be noted that many of the elements that compose this assemblage were 
carefully and strictly aligned prior to the test. The machinery that make-up the various 
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instruments of the ECG is an example of this. The technical components that makes up 
this machinery, particularly the print-out device which contains a series of oscillating 
needles, have been carefully aligned in their construction which has been fixed as 
physically-bounded apparatus. This insures the technical components operate as the 
designer or engineer intended and reduces the possibility of unwanted, foreign actors.  
Through its construction, it insures that it interacts with surrounding elements, such as 
the electrodes and the electrical impulses of the heart, in a predictable fashion, provided 
it is used correctly. In this sense, we can say that the device as a whole operates as an 
important actor in this assemblage: without it and the designer’s knowledge and beliefs 
that it incorporates, the electrical impulses of the heart would fail to produce any 
intelligible signal.  
 Obviously the functioning of this actor is dependent on the two other principal 
actors of the assemblage: the technician and the cardiologist. As we have seen above, 
both play a pivotal role in insuring that all the elements of the test, particularly Simon’s 
body, are aligned correctly. The technician is responsible for cleaning the skin and 
attaching the electrodes, and both, as we have seen, coach Simon on how to interact with 
the treadmill. As actors, both the technician and the cardiologist bring their training and 
previous experiences to bear on the assembling of elements. 
 
 
2 – Transforming matter 
The careful alignment of elements, therefore, regulates which other elements will be 
included in the assemblage.  While unwanted elements and the noise they tend to 
produce are restricted from the interaction, others are encouraged to participate.  We 
have already seen how the correct placement of the electrodes insures the electrical 
impulses controlling heart function can be deciphered, but it is worth noting a few more, 
as these constitute a series of transformations that are necessary for the enactment of the 
heart.  
 As the technician and cardiologist verbally instruct Simon to lengthen his steps, 
and as his paces speed-up in-tune with the treadmill, Simon’s exercising muscles are 
induced to increase metabolic activity in order to produce the necessary energy required 
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for the movement. This requires plenty of oxygen, provided by blood which must be 
circulated by the heart. As the rate of activity increases, so must heart activity to insure 
sufficient oxygenated blood is supplied to Simon’s muscles. This activity is regulated by 
electrical impulses which travel from the sinoatrial node to the various parts of the heart. 
This electrical activity induces a corresponding agitation of electrons on the electrodes 
attached to Simon’s chest, initiating a movement of electrons throughout the wires to the 
print-out device. Electron movement causes a series of needles to oscillate, which leave 
an ink mark on a slowly scrolling, roll of standardized ECG graph paper.    
 Here we have a series of elements which are induced to participate in the 
assemblage; they too become elements that are aligned. Simon’s muscles fibres, his 
circulating and oxygenated blood, his beating heart, the metal electrons in the electrodes 
and wiring, and the needles of the print-out device, are made to act, inter-act, to have an 
affect. We could say that particular capacities of interaction of each of these elements are 
being realised and utilized through their association in order to enact the heart. As the 
inter-action takes place during the test, there is a series of transformations going on as 
matter is being transformed from one state to another. The verbal instructions of the 
technician and cardiologist, and the movement of the treadmill, are converted into 
muscular movement by Simon. The events in Simon’s body are transformed into 
electron movement in the ECG device, which subsequently transforms this into an ink 
pattern on graph paper.  Traditional physical boundaries of the body are traversed as 
somatic elements within the body respond to some extra-somatic elements, which, in 
turn, transform other extra-somatic elements. So, in order to generate meaningful 
scribbles on the ECG graph paper, an assemblage is constructed that is a mixture of 
coordinated, interacting somatic and non-somatic elements. We have here, then, a hybrid 
assemblage of the organic and the non-organic. 
 
 
3 – Speaking for the Heart 
The product of this assemblage, aside from Simon’s breathlessness and sweat, is the ink 
scribbles on the graph paper. Events taking place inside Simon’s body have been 
inscribed on a scroll of paper that can then be read as an indicator of the ability of the 
heart to function correctly under stress. By aligning the elements carefully, bringing 
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desired elements into play and preventing unwanted actors from appearing, the heart is 
being enacted. The heart has been enacted by a largely material assemblage, which as we 
have just seen, includes a range of elements: our principal actors, the cardiologist and the 
technician; the machinery of the ECG device; the treadmill; and the various elements 
within Simon’s body which have been induced to participate.  
 
 This assemblage constitutes what Latour refers to as an inscription device. These 
are configurations of elements that transform a material substance (in this case the 
electrical impulses of the heart) into a figure or diagram (the ink marks on the graph 
paper) which is directly usable (Latour 1986: 51). The diagram or figure produced is 
regarded as having a direct relationship to properties of the matter it was transformed 
from. At the end of the test, while Simon sits down on the chair that has been provided 
for him, the cardiologist is able to use this ink inscription to make a judgement about the 
health of the heart. 
 
Cardiologist:  Okay, well, that all looks very good.  You did a really good stress test, we got you over 
  a hundred percent maximum heart rate so it means we really stressed the heart…  
  there’s been nothing on the ECG, so that’s a normal stress test. 
 
Simon:  Okay. 
 
Cardiologist: So therefore I don’t think the chest tightness and things you’re getting is angina and 
  from that point of view I don’t think we need to worry about doing the other types of 
  tests or anything…  Basically the treadmill test has gone fine.  
 
Here a particular diagnosis, angina, is rejected. This constitutes a translation, which is 
made on the premise that the inscription has a direct, representative relationship with the 
properties of the heart. Latour has noted that within the scientific community, once the 
inscription has been produced and the parts of the inner body have been made visible, 
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the very implements that went into its construction are often ignored and absent from 
conversation (Latour 1986: 51). The highly contingent nature of the inscription or image 
is overlooked, and it therefore comes in to stand on its own as a reflection of reality. A 
fact is constructed, but the apparatuses of construction are invisible: that fact stands on 
its own. Certainly at this stage the cardiologist is treating the inscription as a trustworthy 
representation of the heart’s function, but it is not yet clear whether the assemblage that 
produced it will be bracketed-off from conversation. We will come back to this point in 
the next section. 
 It is worth noting that via the inscription device, the cardiologist has situated 
himself as the spokes-agent for the heart. Although he appears to be tentative about his 
rejection of angina as a cause, indicated by phrases such as “I don’t think the tightness 
and things you’re getting are angina”, he is nonetheless claiming to represent the 
properties of the heart. The heart has been enacted, or translated as having normal 
function, and it is the cardiologist who makes this final proclamation. And, via the 
assemblage, the heart has been imbued with qualities that allow the cardiologist to make 
decisions about what further steps need to be taken.  The heart, then, has become the 
basis for further action. In this case, the action taken by the cardiologist is to state that: 
“I don’t think we need to worry about doing the other types of tests or anything”.  
 Simon’s role as an actor is much more limited in this assemblage. In the GP 
consultation, we saw that he was a major actor in bringing elements into the enactment 
of chest pain: it was through the interaction between him and the GP that his chest pain 
acquired the form that it did.  In the assemblage above, we have seen that his body and 
elements within his body are necessary for the enactment of his heart to take place. He 
must coordinate his body as instructed by the technician and cardiologist, but any 
compliant body would have been sufficient: In a sense, Simon, as a decision-making, feeling, 
emotional individual is absent from this assemblage. He is physically present, but none of 
these so called subjective capacities for interaction are realised in the interaction. The way 
that his body is positioned and coordinated is the consequence of his compliance to the 
instructions of the principal actors, the technician and the cardiologist, and consequently, 
Simon’s role as an actor is almost non-existent. His body and body parts are involved in 
the aligning of elements, but Simon, as a potentially subjective, emotional being, plays 
very little role in the enactment of his heart.  
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We have seen how it is that an assemblage is constructed, and how this assemblage 
enacts the heart. The technician and cardiologist carefully align a series of elements, 
including Simon’s body, the treadmill, and the components of the ECG device (which, 
through its construction and design, are preset to interact in a particular way). This 
careful alignment insures that some elements within the body are made to interact, to 
have an effect and thus speak, while the many unwanted, potentially noisy actors are 
avoided. Through the interaction of these coordinated elements, a series of matter 
transformations take place which result in the production of an inscription. This 
inscription is presumed by the cardiologist to represent the functioning of Simon’s heart, 
which, as a consequence, is translated as most likely being healthy.  The assemblage is a 
hybrid composed of both organic and non-organic elements; it is what we might call a 
techno-body, almost divorced from subjective capacities of the body’s possessor, Simon.  
 The assemblage can also be seen as a transient machine for producing a sense of 
order from monadic complexity. While the test takes place and Simon runs on the 
treadmill as instructed, while his heart responds to electrical impulses from the sinoatrial 
node and is forced to pump oxygenated blood to his exercising muscles, while electrons 
within the electrodes respond to these electrical waves, travel along the wires and induce 
the oscillation of a needle that leaves an ink mark on standardised graph paper, we have 
the transient, coordinated inter-acting of elements. We have an inscription, an intelligible 
representation of the heart. This is the fleeting production of order from the otherwise 
noise-ridden, messy complexity of flesh and blood, wires, swabs, papers and the 
idiosyncrasy of humans. So far on our foray through the healthcare system with Simon, 
we have seen two ordering practices take place. In the GP consultation, we had the 
enactment of chest pain. This led to series of further actions, one of which was the 
assemblage, the enactment of the heart, we have just witnessed. Our next task, then, is to 
follow Simon one further step as he partakes in a treadmill debrief consultation with the 
cardiologist.  This involves, as we will see, a third ordering practice, one that aims to 
provide a sense of overall coherence to the two enactments we have seen up to this 
point. 
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Section 3: Coordinating Coherence 
In our first location, we had the enactment of chest pain. Through the interaction of the 
GP and Simon, chest pain became intelligible as a tightness in the chest area, not being 
associated with nausea and sweats, not radiating the arm or neck, and was associated with 
a family history of heart problems a history of smoking, and stress and anxiety – a 
translation consolidated by the GP in Simon’s medical notes. In our second location, the 
treadmill stress test, we have an enactment of heart function. Via the careful construction 
of an inscription device, the heart was made visible, intelligible, as not causing angina and 
as free of blockages or narrowings. In two locations, then, we have two different 
assemblages and two different enactments; two different ordering practices have 
produced two intelligible entities. Simon, the GP, and the cardiologist could leave it at 
this. The two enactments could be seen as just that: the contingent products of two, 
discrete assemblages at two discrete locations: multiple worlds producing their own, 
distinct objects of the body. If such a viewpoint was taken, if such objects could be seen 
as simply occupying separate worlds characterised by different ordering practices, then 
Simon’s medical foray could end here. He, along with the GP and cardiologist, could 
settle on the knowledge that in one location Simon has chest pain with particular 
characteristics, and in another, Simon’s heart function has its own particular set of 
characteristics. 
 This approach, however, is not taken by the cardiologist. As we have already 
seen, the treadmill test was predicated on the presupposition that Simon’s chest pain and 
heart function could be linked: 
 
GP:  Obviously, the pain, what you worry about and what we worry about it whether it is 
  coming from the  heart… I think we need to look at… send[ing] you off to run on a 
  treadmill test… It has a pretty good rate for picking up a heart that’s not getting as 
  much oxygen as it wants.    
 
We have also seen the cardiologist make the same link, adding angina into the 
explanation:  
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Cardiologist: :  The heart’s a muscle pump and it has three arteries that supply blood to that muscle, 
  and what we are trying to do is see if there is any chance you have a narrowing or a 
  blockage to one of those three arteries that is restricting the blood flow down the artery 
  to the muscle beyond, so that when you stress the heart it doesn’t get the blood it needs 
  and you get angina, you get chest tightness… So what we are going to do is head down 
  to the … see if you get any chest pains, if we see any in your ECG changes to indicate 
  there is a problem. 
 
The GP and cardiologist both frame chest pain as something that is often linked to the 
heart. Chest pain can be angina, and it is a symptom of blockages of the heart arteries (the 
cause). This symptom-cause rendering of chest pain and heart function discloses a belief 
in a singular, coherent reality, where chest pain and heart function, regardless of where 
and how they may be enacted, can occupy the same, coherent body. In this section, we 
will see how this belief is further manifested in various actions, and how it influences the 
final diagnosis, or translation, of Simon’s heart and chest pain. This final translation takes 
place back in the cardiologist’s consultation room, just after the conclusion of the 
treadmill stress test. The cardiologist has settled into his chair behind his desk, and 
Simon occupies one of the two patient’s chairs directly in front. Again, before we begin 
with this post-treadmill debrief, I will provide some theoretical background.       
  
A Sociology of Reality 
Within the last hundred years or so there has been a significant division between thinkers 
who subscribe to the belief of a universal, coherent reality, and those who dismiss such 
ideas as naïve and totalising. A great deal of the debate between these two groups has 
been stimulated by those studying scientific practice and method. Here I will briefly 
discuss some of the arguments of those involved in this debate, as this will provide us 
with context to the approach that we will adopt for this section.  
 The notion that there is an external, singular reality, which, with good scientific 
practice, can be rendered intelligible, was challenged with some force by Thomas Kuhn’s 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1996). Kuhn disputed the idea that science was a 
unified movement involving the linear accumulation of facts. He argued that scientific 
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activity took place within particular paradigms which provide a conceptual framework 
influencing the sort of experiments that would be undertaken and how the results would 
be perceived (Kuhn 1996: 24). As anomalies and inconsistencies accumulate in these 
periods of normal science, scientific revolutions occur bringing on a new paradigm 
(Kuhn 1996: 53-65). Rival and successive paradigms are often incommensurable, and the 
conceptual framework of one paradigm cannot be understood in another (Kuhn 1996:  
112). Although there has been some debate over whether Kuhn is arguing for a relativist 
account (Kuhn 1977), he does suggest that it is not useful to assume the existence of a 
singular, true account of nature. As paradigms change, so do worldviews (Kuhn 1996: 
111). Science may increase in complexity as revolutions occur, but this does not 
necessarily constitute a progression towards one truth. Kuhn, therefore, points towards a 
pluralism of knowledges and worlds.  
 Ian Hacking has also commented on this apparent incommensurability in science 
practice, although he takes a more materialist stance. The instruments in one paradigm 
may differ markedly from those of another (Hacking 1992: 56): the form of the 
experiments that can be conducted and thus the type of results generated are often 
significantly different between paradigms, thus producing divergent areas of knowledge. 
Disunity in science is because phenomena are produced by divergent techniques and 
instrumentation, and corresponding theories are produced that are true to these 
particular phenomena (Hacking 1992: 57-58). There is no single truth, or no single reality 
that is being uncovered. Practices, instruments and theories construct various 
knowledges. As Mol states, Hacking is suggesting that a “plethora of techniques makes 
for a multiplication of reality” (Mol 2002: 75).   
 Hacking does not, however, investigate how such realities are negotiated; 
whether differing worldviews are able to coexist, or whether such diversity is ignored to 
sustain a belief in a singular, coherent reality.  Mol examines such negotiations in The 
Body Multiple (2002). In the hospital, different practices enacted multiple atherosclerosies. 
In some cases, these enactments could coexist without the need for the prioritising of 
one over another, particularly when these enactments were taking place in discrete 
locations. But, as Mol puts it, “the body multiple hangs together” (2002: 55): different 
locations were linked, often by the circulation of a patient’s medical file, which would 
coordinate different enactments into a representation of a single, coherent patient. If 
contradictions occurred between enactments, such as a patient’s experience of pain and 
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the clinical diagnosis, one would have to be discarded, by pointing to the fallibility of 
either the patient’s “subjective feelings”, or the clinical equipment (Mol 2002: 62). 
Coherence is also achieved by employing stories about how particular enactments hang 
together, aetiological stories about how the cellular events, for instance, cause the various 
pains experienced by patients (Mol 2002: 60). As Law puts it: “alongside the practices of 
multiplicity, there are endless practices insisting on, presupposing, and producing 
singularity” (2004: 65).  
 Coherence, then, is an achievement. There are different realities produced by 
different practices, but these can be, and often are in a hospital, amalgamated to produce 
a singular, coherent order of things. The position of Hacking and Mol that we are 
adopting here sees knowledge as being unique to the situation in which it was produced. 
Coherence is possible. But to create a situation where a singular viewpoint is achieved, 
would require domination: it would necessitate the spreading and circulating of the 
various practices that insist on, presuppose and produce singularity. Again, we are not 
interested in presupposing the existence of a particular type of world, or a fundamental 
incompatibility between distinct worlds produced by distinct knowledges. Following Mol, 
we are interested in how such situations are produced; how it is that actors create 
multiple worlds, and how it is that multiplicity may be coordinated to produce a sense of 
coherence and singularity. In this section, then, our task is to again follow the actors. We 
will observe the cardiologist and Simon as a final diagnosis is achieved. This enactment 
involves a series of ordering practices that coordinate the two previous enactments of 
chest pain and the heart, into a single, coherent body.  
 
 
The Post-treadmill debrief  
1 – Symptom-cause coherence 
Before we begin following the debrief, it is necessary here to highlight the role of medical 
notes in linking enactments and providing a sense of coherence in Simon’s case. A copy 
of Simon’s medical notes, which, as we saw in the consultation, were written by the GP, 
was sent to the cardiologist along with a brief referral letter. Simon’s name, age and 
ethnicity are stated at the beginning of the notes, and below, along with the details of his 
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chest pain, are the results of the various tests ordered by the GP. The cardiologist was 
therefore aware of Simon and the details of his chest pain prior to the treadmill test. At 
the end of the test, the ECG results were added to the notes, which were to be returned 
to the GP. The notes, then, are effectively linking the various locations where enactments 
took place, coordinating and adding the knowledge produced in these locations into a 
representation of a single patient.  In other words, Simon’s medical notes pull-together 
discrete assembling practices by combining the various entities they enact, under the 
name of a specific individual. These medical notes are not the only coordinating practices 
we see, however. Throughout the debrief, the cardiologist employs other means of 
creating a sense of coherence and singularity.   
 
The debrief begins with the cardiologist restating the purpose of the treadmill stress test. 
In doing so, he explicitly links the enactment of chest pain and the enactment of the 
heart together.  
 
Cardiologist: The most important thing we’ve done this afternoon is looked at the heart and tried to 
  decide whether you presently have any narrowings and blockages in those arteries to 
  explain the chest tightness. 
 
Again, chest tightness is framed as a symptom, and narrowings of the arteries are framed 
as a possible cause.  Both enactments are seen as representing linked objects within the 
one body, Simon’s body. The cardiologist then goes on to restate the findings of the 
treadmill test: 
 
Cardiologist: You’ve done an excellent treadmill test, taken you to the maximum predicted heart 
  rate, no problems at all. No symptoms, nothing on ECG, everything’s good.  
 
There is a problem here, however. If Simon’s chest pain is a symptom, then there must 
be a cause. Yet the treadmill stress test failed to find a cause. The two enactments are 
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thus potentially contradictory, as one suggests the presence of heart problems and the 
other indicates the absence of heart problems. This would not necessarily be problematic 
if the two enactments were seen as the contingent products of two, discrete practices, 
producing different worlds. But, by making the symptom-cause link, the cardiologist is 
required to explain the potential contradictions. Two tactics are used by the cardiologist 
to do this.  The first is to suggest other causes: 
 
Cardiologist: You might find that that’s… muscular skeletal sort of tension, chest wall discomfort 
  that we can all get if we worry or get stressed about something. We can sort of over-
  breathe a little bit and that can bring on the tension and chest discomfort in the chest 
  wall, so I suppose in a way I’m putting it down to that maybe being a cause for your 
  chest pain.    
 
Here, the cardiologist brings in “muscular skeletal tension”, “chest wall”, “stress”, and 
“worry” as explanations for Simon’s chest pain: stress and anxiety are therefore being put 
forward as a cause. This is not surprising, since this was stated as the most likely 
explanation of Simon’s chest pain during the GP consultation, and the cardiologist’s 
findings would indicate that the GP was correct in stating that it “is not heart related. I 
suspect its coming from the chest wall”. The cardiologist also speculates on another 
possible cause, the stomach: 
 
Cardiologist: Alternatively, the other option in terms of chest pain, can be coming from your  
  stomach. And so if your GP’s concerned about that, sometimes have a look in your 
  stomach to see whether there is any reason there why you get chest pain. 
 
 
By putting forward both the stomach and stress as possible causes for Simon’s chest 
pain, the cardiologist is able to provide an explanation for both enactments while 
maintaining the idea of a coherent, singular body. The enactment of Simon’s chest pain 
can be explained as a symptom of processes that would not have been detected in the 
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treadmill test. Simon, therefore, has chest pain as enacted in the GP consultation, he also 
has a healthy heart, free of blockages and narrowings, as enacted in the treadmill test, and 
he has either a troublesome stomach or tightness of the chest wall caused by stress. In 
this situation, both enactments are seen as producing reliable information about one, 
coherent, singular body.  
  
2 – Destabilising enactments  
At this point it could seem like we have a final diagnosis, or translation, for Simon’s chest 
pain. The cardiologist appears to have proven that it is not heart related, and along with 
the GP, has stated that stress and anxiety are the most likely cause. The possible 
contradiction between the two enactments has been avoided.  But the cardiologist makes 
another suggestion to Simon. This is the second tactic he uses to explain the possible 
contradiction.   
 
Cardiologist: A precaution: the treadmill test is just the basic screening test and there is a chance its 
  wrong.   
 
In this situation, the inconsistency between Simon’s chest pain and heart is explained as 
being the result of a possible inaccuracy. The treadmill test, a “basic screening test”, 
might be “wrong”, suggesting that it may produce an inaccurate or false representation 
of the heart, and the cardiologist, therefore, is suggesting that Simon’s heart may have 
blockages or narrowings that are causing his chest pain.  
 What is interesting here is that the means of doubting the reliability of the 
enactment of the heart is to highlight the contingent nature of its production. The 
presence of Simon’s chest pain, for example, has not been doubted by the cardiologist. It 
has been dealt with and talked-about as though it is a fact, not just the product of the 
assembling practices within the GP consultation. The “healthy heart, free of blockages”, 
however, has been undermined by linking it to one of the conditions of its production 
(the treadmill test), and by pointing to the fallibility of these conditions (“there is a 
chance its wrong”).  As the product of a fallible test, the representation produced by the 
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inscription device, therefore, does not necessarily represent any facts about the heart. As 
Mol has noted, by unbracketing the practicalities of measurements, the findings of such 
measurements can be discarded (2002: 64). This second tactic of maintaining coherence, 
therefore, involves undermining the accurateness of an image or representation by 
exposing the usually invisible conditions, or parts of the assemblage, responsible for its 
production. It is no longer a “fact” that stands on its own; but rather the product of 
various fallible apparatuses.    
 
By adhering to the symptom-cause link, the belief that chest pain is a symptom of events 
within the same body, the cardiologist has had to employ two tactics  As we have seen, 
he has to either postulate another (quite likely) cause, or suggest that one of the 
enactments is mistaken. The effect of employing these two tactics is to reproduce the 
integrity of the singular, coherent body; a body where a troublesome stomach or anxiety 
cause chest pain, or a body where heart blockages and narrowings cause chest pain.  
By employing the second tactic, the cardiologist is indicating that the integrity of 
the coherent body is more important than maintaining confidence in the ability of 
particular tests to produce accurate results. If contradictions occur, it seems enactments 
will be sacrificed in favour of maintaining the singular body. This tactic, however, has 
repercussions for the concluding translation of Simon’s chest pain.  
 
 
3 – Surveillance and self management    
In section 1, we saw that Simon’s chest pain was translated as being associated with 
stress and anxiety, a family history of heart disease and smoking, and possibly the 
presence of “unhappy heart cells”, to quote the GP.  This was consolidated within the 
GP’s medical notes, a copy of which was sent to the cardiologist. We have also seen, in 
this section, that by employing the first tactic to avoid contradiction, the cardiologist 
confirmed the association between chest pain and anxiety. If it were not for the second 
tactic, the cardiologist may well have enacted chest pain as a symptom of anxiety.  
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 In utilising tactic 2, however, the unlikely but nonetheless risky association 
between chest pain and the heart, which was first made in the GP consultation, persists, 
and it is still possible that Simon’s chest pain is a symptom of heart problems. Because of 
this risk, the cardiologist issues the following instructions:  
 
Cardiologist:  …and there is a chance [the treadmill test] is wrong, and so if you find your symptoms  
  changed,  in particular if you start getting, as you’re walking up those steps at home, if you 
  start finding you do get chest tightness or chest pain in that situation, then come back and see 
  us, because there are other more accurate tests we can do to look at see whether this is a  
  problem.  
 
Simon:  Yep, okay. 
 
Here, the cardiologist is asking Simon to take note of any possible changes in his bodily 
experience of pain as he undertakes certain tasks; specifically, to be aware of any chest 
tightness occurring as exercise is undertaken. Simon is being instructed, therefore, to be 
vigilant and engage in self-surveillance of his exercising activities and particular bodily 
sensations. The cardiologist makes some further suggestions: 
 
 
Cardiologist: So, just moving onto the preventative side of things. The best thing you did for yourself 
  was to stop smoking, that halves your chance of coming back with a cardiac problem, 
  so we don’t have to worry about dwelling on that.  
 
Simon:  Yep. 
 
Cardiologist: And, in terms of preventing cardiac disease, the other thing that is important of course 
  is your cholesterol. Your GP has given us that your cholesterol is four point three.  
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  What we are actually more worried about is your LDL cholesterol, which is the really 
  bad part of the fat, two point five. Considering your HDL, which is the good part of 
  the fat, which, if you like, goes around scavenging that bad fat. Okay, so your HDL 
  is normal and your LDL is satisfactory, so we don’t need to start you on any  
  cholesterol therapy. 
 
Firstly, the cardiologist introduces smoking and cholesterol, both its “good” and “bad” 
components, into a discussion about preventing cardiac problems. Both are framed as 
elements that Simon must take into account and manage in an attempt to maintain a 
healthy heart. Smoking must be avoided, and both HDL and LDL must be maintained at 
various “normal levels”. 
 
Cardiologist: Your blood pressure is another risk, that’s fine, so I don’t need to start you on  
  anything there… A small dose of aspirin reduces your chances of stroke or heart  
  disease so I’m happy with you to carry on with that. 
 
Secondly, “blood pressure” and “aspirin” are introduced as an element requiring some 
sort of management, and Simon is encouraged to maintain taking a “small dose” of 
aspirin daily.  
 
Cardiologist: Your diet was good, so yeah, really it comes back in terms of just thinking about your 
  lifestyle and things. Its just a matter of trying to encourage you to do more exercise, you 
  know, maybe park further from work… you know, just go for a walk everyday, forty 
  five minutes. Doesn’t matter if its gym, walking, swimming, whatever, cycling. 
 
Simon:   What about an exercycle at home? 
 
Cardiologist: Absolutely fine, whatever. 
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Thirdly, exercise, specifically forty-five minutes each day, is suggested as a requirement 
for a lifestyle that decreases the chances of cardiac problems, and walking, gym, 
swimming, cycling, and parking further from work, are framed as preventative measures. 
 
Cardiologist:  …forty five minutes a day is good for you. And don’t forget the fish either. . Two fish 
  meals a week. 
 
Simon:  Yes, I must try and find some new recipes. 
 
Cardiologist: It is good for you. 
 
Simon:  Yeah it’s just my partner doesn’t like fish very much you see, and she does the cooking. 
 
Cardiologist: Get maybe fish when you go out to a restaurant. Just whatever.   I think fish would be 
  the only thing I suggest in your diet because it seems like you are doing everything else.  
 
And fourthly, we see that Simon is encouraged to eat fish twice a week: eating fish is 
framed as a management technique for avoiding cardiac problems.  
 Because of the risky association between Simon’s chest pain and heart disease, 
the cardiologist is encouraging Simon not only to be vigilant, but also to manage his day-
to-day activities so that he can decrease the likelihood of cardiac problems. The 
cardiologist has, in effect, outlined the criteria necessary for a healthy lifestyle centred on 
avoiding cardiac problems. He has stated what sort of factors need to be considered; 
smoking, cholesterol, blood pressure, exercise and diet, and how these are best managed; 
avoidance, aspirin, daily exercise, and consuming fish. And while it is the cardiologist 
who stipulates these criteria, it is Simon who is issued with the responsibility for adhering 
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to this lifestyle: in addition to monitoring his own bodily sensations, Simon must also 
insure that he, himself, takes aspirin, exercises forty-five minutes each day, avoids 
smoking, and eats fish. Simon, then is, being enacted as a self-responsible individual.   
 In the process of having a series of criteria for a healthy cardiac lifestyle mapped 
out, Simon is being made conscious of a world of entities of which he may have 
previously been unaware. The cardiologist has provided a list of elements which Simon 
must now take into account in his day-to-day activities. He must pay attention to 
particular things that previously were just part of an undiscernible, un-affecting mess, an 
ignorable background to his everyday activities. These things have now become actors: 
things to be aware of, to take note of, and according to which he must regulate his 
behaviour. Simon, if he has listened to his cardiologist, is now sensitive to chest tightness 
while exercising, HDL, LDL, fish on a restaurant menu, and parking distances. Such 
elements have been made visible, or at least reframed, in terms of a healthy cardiac 
lifestyle which Simon has been instructed to follow. So, as well as being enacted as a self-
responsible individual, Simon has also been placed within a constructed world; a world 
where cardiac-health influences which elements are to be noticed and which practices 
should be undertaken. Of course, whether Simon stays attentive to such a world, or 
quickly recourses to a more familiar, “pre-cardiac” habitual world is another question. 
And, the two worlds may not be that dissimilar: Simon has no doubt been exposed to the 
many, widely circulating messages linking heart disease to diet, smoking, and so forth, for 
most of his adult life. But nonetheless, the interaction with the cardiologist has, at the 
very least, reasserted the immediacy and relevance of a world where lifestyle is orientated 
towards cardiac health. 
 
So, in this post-treadmill debrief, we have the enactment of Simon as a self-responsible 
individual, and the enactment, or reproduction, of a world of cardiac health-relevant 
practices and elements. What, however, can we say about the enactment of Simon’s chest 
pain? Our principal actor here, the cardiologist, talked about a chest pain that is most 
likely caused by anxiety, and may possibly be related to stomach troubles. But the 
diagnosis did not end here. He also talked about a chest pain, the same chest pain, as 
being the unlikely but nevertheless possible symptom of heart troubles. The treadmill 
test, he said, was fallible and the risky link between chest pain and the heart could not be 
discarded.  Because of this, Simon was instructed to be alert to any additional symptoms.  
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We have, therefore, a chest pain that is most likely a symptom of anxiety, but possibly a 
symptom of stomach troubles, and possibly a symptom of heart artery blockages and 
narrowings. The exact nature of the chest pain, then, is indefinite. It is not enacted as a 
solid, precise, bounded entity: rather, it is open and unclear, potentially hazardous and a 
source of vigilance and self-management. It is most likely linked to anxiety and therefore 
associated with a range of psychological elements, but it retains its links to a troublesome 
heart and thus all the corresponding cardiac elements. Where its associations begin and 
end is not exactly known, and it has resisted the culling of explanatory elements that 
would allow a more definite translation. This is the cost of assuming the existence of a 
single, coherent reality and the consequence of the cardiologist’s employment of the two 
tactics above. The enactment of chest pain and the enactment of the heart, despite the 
contingent nature of their production, are coordinated, added together, as though they 
represent linked elements or events in one coherent reality. Chest pain is a symptom, and 
along with its cause, it occupies a single, coherent body. As a consequence, rather than 
having two discrete enactments occupying distinct assembling practices, we have one 
body and one reality, where chest pain has been enacted as a single but indefinite and 
imprecise entity. Perhaps, as Law suggests, much of the world is enacted in this way 
(2004: 14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 – Discussion 
 
 
 
In the preceding sections we observed three instances of medicine in action. In each 
case, adhering to the proscriptions of Actor-Network theory, we witnessed a series of 
assembling practices. Some elements became associated to create an account or an 
enactment, while many more elements were elided, ignored, or discarded. Rather than 
limiting ourselves to following so-called “social” phenomena, we expanded our vision to 
include a longer list of practices and elements. We also refrained from making any 
presuppositions about whom or what could be principal actors in constructing such 
accounts. And rather than insisting upon an underlying singular reality, or a multiplicity 
of realities, we watched how these were created by various assembling practices.   
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In this discussion we will briefly overview what we have seen in each of the three 
interactions. Firstly, I will relate my findings to the biomedical model, and I will illustrate 
how these medical practices produce particular types of patients. Secondly, I will discuss 
the ranking and sorting of various accounts: those produced largely by diagnostic 
instruments with those accounts produced by patients. I will then pay particular attention 
to the indefinite, uncertain nature of diagnosis and argue that, based on what we have 
seen here, a great deal of medicine is conducted in this way: the body and body parts 
often escape being endowed with definite, certain form. Thirdly, I will argue that we have 
been witnessing the operations that constitute power. Using Foucault’s rendition, I will 
illustrate that we have seen instances of productive power and restrictive power, and we 
have also seen instances where domination may occur, where the patient’s account is 
being discarded in favour of the accounts produced by other actors. I will conclude by 
arguing that sociologists are well placed to challenge domination by highlighting and 
multiplying uncertainties. This provides a margin for alternative accounts, such as the 
patient’s, to influence the ordering of things.   
  
In each of the three sections we have seen how entities become intelligible. As 
associations formed between entities, a series of capacities for interaction were realised 
which generated an account. The interaction between the GP and the patient enacted a 
chest pain that occurred in a particular part of the body, was associated with a family 
history of heart disease and a history of smoking, and as not being associated with sharp, 
spreading pains or exertion. In the treadmill stress test, the technician and cardiologist 
carefully assembled the ECG device and Simons’ body so that the electrical impulses of 
the heart would, via the movement of electrons, induce the movement of a series of 
inked needles on graph paper. The resulting inscription indicated that the heart was 
healthy and free of blockages. In the post-treadmill debrief, Simon’s chest pain was 
enacted as an indefinite, potentially risky condition as the cardiologist employed two 
tactics aimed at explaining away possible contradictions between the two elements. In the 
process, a world based on cardiac health awareness was constructed, within which Simon 
was enacted as a self-responsible, vigilant individual. In each case, we have avoided 
prematurely assigning causation to particular entities, and we have let the actors decide 
which sort of elements are to be used in accounts. Consequently, we have seen how it is 
that medical practices produce intelligible entities, and how such entities become a source 
for further action; how it is that patients, GPs, specialists, technicians and medical 
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instruments coordinate to build and order a world, or multiple worlds, comprised of 
often tangible and utilisable, but sometimes indefinite and vague, things.  To put it 
concisely, we have witnessed the ordering of things in medical interactions.   
 
 What can we say about the various ordering practices themselves? Firstly, from 
following Simon’s experiences in the medical system, it is unreasonable to criticize 
medicine for failing to take into account social and psychological elements when dealing 
with patients. According to the biomedical model, supposedly the dominant paradigm in 
modern western medicine, the body is treated as being separate to the mind, and as 
something which can be repaired in much the same way as a machine. Doctors, like 
engineers, seek to understand and treat disease according to the body’s broken 
components, ignoring any potential social causes or explanations (Nettleton and 
Gustafsson 2002: 2).  This biomedical model does not seem to dictate the events of 
Simon’s GP consultation. There is certainly a focus on internal, somatic elements 
(“unhappy heart cells”, “tropinin T”, “chest wall”), but these are not at the exclusion of 
social and psychological elements (“broken sleep”, “angsting” over the death of a close 
relative, “self-worth”, and so on). Indeed, as we saw, the GP states that the cause is 
probably “existential sort of stuff”, and suggests counselling would be helpful. Similarly, 
in the post-treadmill debrief, Simon is entwined in talk of anxiety, eating habits, exercise 
and lifestyle. Social elements and explanations appear to sit side-by-side with somatic 
elements: the GP in particular seems to move without discord from talk about cells and 
organs to family histories and existential crises.  
 Social and psychological elements are absent from the enactment of the heart 
produced in the treadmill test, however. The assemblage or inscription device was 
arranged so that only very particular somatic elements of the body would be brought into 
the interaction, and, as a consequence, the heart was made intelligible in terms of its 
ability to adequately conduct and respond to the electrical impulses controlling heart rate. 
Because of the controlled nature of the procedure and the fixed composition of the 
instruments, there was no allowance for Simon’s anxieties or opinions to influence the 
inscription.  While his body was carefully aligned and exercised, Simon, as a potentially 
expressive, emotional and accounting individual was, essentially, absent. Here we are very 
close to a split between the mind and the physical body that is said to be symptomatic of 
the biomedical model. The tissues and spaces of the body were treated as if they alone 
could speak for the heart; not the thinking, feeling, expressive Simon.  It seems, then, 
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that from our examples of medicine in action, we have one instance where social and 
psychological elements were vital in producing intelligibility, and one instance where 
these sorts of elements were completely ignored. From this, we could state that it is 
unfair to accuse all medical practices of being dictated by the biomedical model 
paradigm, yet there are nonetheless practices which do conform to some of its central 
tenets. 
 In light of Mol’s exposition of hospital practices, this insight into the variability 
of medicine in action hardly seems radical.  But this variability does raise some interesting 
points concerning the role of medicine in enacting, or reproducing, particular types of 
patients. In our first location, Simon, through his responses to the GP’s questions and 
his articulation of his anxieties, was actively involved in bringing elements into the 
account of chest pain. Although the GP directed the line of questioning, chest pain 
would not have been enacted as it was, without Simon.  In the process of producing an 
enactment, he became a spokes-agent for his bodily-sensations; he himself was enacted, 
via this consultation, as a feeling, expressive, accounting individual. This contrasts with 
his role in the treadmill stress test. In an effort to peer into the body, to make the heart 
visible, Simon, who was a principal actor in producing chest pain, was effectively muted. 
As a patient, he was little more than a compliant body.  Instead, it was the cardiologist, 
via the inscription device, who was the spokes-agent for the spaces within Simon’s body. 
Here we are close to the body-as-object that Foucault refers to: the body as a tangible, 
fleshy assortment of tissues, within which can be found the truth of life and the 
processes of disease and death (Foucault 2003: 9). By having instrumentation and the 
cardiologist as spokes-agents, we can see how Simon, or any patient in this situation, may 
feel alienated from their own body. In Haraway’s terms, a “God’s eye” view of the body 
has been created via a process that does not involve a contribution from the patient 
himself (1991b). He is temporarily enacted as a series of interacting biological processes 
(aerobic metabolism, electrical impulses, a pumping heart); a physical, functional body 
that exists independent of a thinking, feeling, expressive person.  
 Yet, less than an hour after this, Simon is treated as a self-managing, self-
responsible individual by the cardiologist. Simon, as we saw, is encouraged to monitor 
his bodily sensations and manage his day-to-day activities in accordance with a healthy 
lifestyle. He is enacted as an individual who is both capable of scrutinizing his body and 
of making choices that will improve his health and reduce the risk of cardiac troubles: he 
is being endowed with the control of his own body. This is not necessarily on his terms, 
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however.  Simon is a vigilant, self-responsible individual, but this is within a world that 
has largely been constructed for him. The particular phenomena in his environment that 
he should be taking note of, and the strategies he should be employing, have been 
framed by the cardiologist. Smoking, HDL, LDL, fish, aspirin: these are some of the 
elements which should now become the basis for a series of actions. What it means for 
him to be an individual agent, then, is the consequence of the ordering practices in which 
he has been enacted. His capacity to act is inextricably linked with how he was enacted. 
A healthy cardiac lifestyle is a lifestyle based around managing and regulating oneself 
with an awareness of the heart as a fleshy, essential and sensitive component within the 
body. This resonates with Rose’s comments on the relationship between biomedicine 
and the individual, where the knowledge produced in biomedical practices becomes a 
basis for particular subjectivities. The individual becomes aware of a body that is 
material, functional, and susceptible, and something which can be maintained via careful 
and active management (Rose 2007: 25-26). The types of representations and images 
produced by the inscription device in the treadmill test prompt an awareness of the 
body’s corporeality, and can become the basis for self-managed, health-orientated 
lifestyles, in accordance with the recommendations of various experts and specialists.  
 
 Simon is therefore something of a multiple entity. In location one, he is a 
principal actor: an accounting, expressive agent. In location two, he is little more than a 
material body of functioning organs. And, in location three, he becomes a vigilant, self-
responsible individual. So, at the end of this experience in the healthcare system, what 
assertions could we make about Simon?  What form, or translation, holds?  Does he have 
a lingering sense of alienation from his body as a result of the treadmill test, or was this 
remedied by the agency he was subsequently endowed with in the debrief? Or, does he 
feel restricted by this knowledge of his heart and the lifestyle it entails? He may wake up 
the next morning having forgotten the whole experience altogether. Such questions 
cannot be answered here, and it is a limitation of this project that we were unable to 
acquire Simon’s reflections on the medical practices some time later. But, nonetheless, 
we have glimpsed how it is that medical practices can construct patients, bodies, and 
individuals. The search for disease and the assembling and reassembling of elements that 
that entails enacts not only pains, organs, and illness, but also actors, people and worlds 
that extend outside the physical bounds of the consultation room and specialist clinic. 
Perhaps we could, using Mol’s phrase, call him a patchwork singularity. The three 
 99 
assemblages enact a different patient, yet these enactments hold together as being Simon; 
an individual as stipulated by his accompanying medical notes, and an individual who 
experiences a persistent physicality. He is part self-made, part machine-made and part-
specialist-made, and he is an accounting, expressive agent, a physical, functional, fleshy 
body, and a self-managing, self-responsible individual.   
 
The second point we can make about the ordering practices we have witnessed is that 
clinical or laboratory findings will not necessarily be trusted more than the claims of the 
patient. If contradictions occur between the patient’s account of pain and a laboratory 
test, it may well be that the latter is discredited.  In our case, neither the GP nor the 
specialist appeared to doubt Simon’s account of his pain. As the cardiologist employs his 
second tactic aimed at maintaining the cause-symptom belief, however, the results of the 
treadmill test are treated with considerable scepticism, and the ability of this inscription 
device to render the true nature of the inner spaces of the body is doubted in favour of 
Simon’s account of his pain.  Here, then, the technological-based rendering of the heart 
does not acquire the status of an objective, truthful reflection of reality.  This finding is in 
contrast to the many highlighted instances in medicine where laboratory and technology-
based renderings have been prioritised over the patient’s subjective feelings. This has 
been illustrated by Rhodes et al. in regards to chronic back pain. Contradictions between 
the technology-based visualisations of the fleshy components of the patient’s back and 
the patient’s bodily sensations of pain are often ameliorated by framing the latter as 
simply being “psychological” or psychosomatic (Rhodes et al. 2002: 46).  Specialists who 
are unable to find any visual evidence of back problems thus assume that the patients are 
unable to provide truthful accounts of their own back. The visible renderings produced 
by laboratory and clinical procedures, on the other hand, are treated as being faithful 
representations of reality (Rhodes et al. 2002: 38).  It is easy to see that this causes 
considerable stress for the patients involved.  Not only must they continue to endure 
intense pain, they also acquire a sense of being alienated from a body that, they are told, 
is healthy (Rhodes et al. 2002: 46).  
Again, then, we are led to variability.  There appears to be no universal rule 
dictating how conflicting accounts are juggled to achieve coherence. There may be, of 
course, some regularity according to the type of medical problem that is being addressed.  
As the cardiologist stated, the treadmill test is a “basic screening test” and “there is a 
chance it is wrong”. The cardiologist, then, knows the test to be problematic. And 
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alternatively, he knows the chest pain may have another cause: anxiety, or the stomach. 
Because of this knowledge, the cardiologist has no need to doubt the presence of 
Simon’s chest pain in the form it has been enacted, and this knowledge is probably 
widespread among cardiologists. Cardiology, therefore, may be an area of medical 
practice where the patient’s account of chest pain it seldom discredited.  There may be, 
to put it another way, a general acceptance within cardiology that producing a reliable 
representation of the heart is difficult. Other areas of medicine, particularly those 
concerned with chronic back pain, may place far more importance on the representations 
and accounts produced by technology-based procedures and tests, and if contradictions 
occur, it is the accounts produced by patients that are dismissed or ignored.    
Determining whether certain areas of medicine accord more weight to the 
reliability of particular types of accounts would require additional empirical research. No 
doubt, in some areas of practice, various institutional regimes would be uncovered which 
stipulate that particular laboratory procedures or clinical tests must be undertaken before 
a course of action can be decided upon, regardless of the patient’s account. Such 
procedures constitute what Callon refers to as translation regimes (1991: 147). These 
essentially channel actors into various assembling practices, drastically reducing the 
potential enactments that could occur, and therefore only permitting certain courses of 
action. Access to certain specialist treatments or drug therapies may be granted only 
when a particular laboratory result is achieved. Uncovering such regimes would allow us 
to pinpoint locations where patients are accorded very little agency and risk being 
dominated by practices outside of their control, as the ability to adequately represent 
reality is transferred to specialised and physically isolated procedures operated by trained 
technicians.   
In our case, there was no such regime and Simon’s ability to produce an account 
of reality was not doubted. It is important to note, however, who it is that has the ability 
to decide which account or enactment can be trusted. In the post-treadmill test debrief, 
we saw that it was the cardiologist who was the principal actor in creating a symptom-
cause coherence, and the cardiologist who had the ability to determine which enactments 
could or could not be trusted. Armed with a knowledge of both the limits of the 
treadmill test, and other potential causes of chest pain, the cardiologist was responsible 
for according weight to particular enactments. Simon played no role in deciding which 
account or enactment could be trusted and which was less reliable. Similarly, and not 
surprisingly, the examples of chronic back pain illustrated by Rhodes et al., it was the 
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various medical specialists who were able to declare the technology-based visualisations 
to be more trustworthy reflections of reality (2002: 36-38). Such cases demonstrate a 
degree of rigidity in medical practices. Certain individuals are invested with the capacity 
to rank and sort various enactments, discarding and ignoring some, while reifying others.  
We could easily trace how this capacity comes about: some individuals are permitted to 
conduct medical procedures and grant access to medical resources by regulatory 
associations and legislature. A high level of specialised training would be required, and 
such individuals would have to demonstrate a command of medical knowledge and 
practices that would then become the basis for ranking and sorting various enactments. 
In this sense, the cardiologist or any medical specialist is not so much a discrete, 
individual agent, but rather a conduit for action; a means by which the worldview and 
beliefs of various medical associations and institutions come to act on the local, 
immediate assembling of entities.  Provided, of course, that the specialist does act in 
accordance with their training, and this cannot always be guaranteed.   
In our case, whether we see the cardiologist as an individual agent or a network 
of various institutional training regimes depends on how far back we trace the lines of 
action, but regardless of when we decide to stop tracing associations, the cardiologist 
occupies an important locus. It is the cardiologist who coordinates the ranking and 
sorting of the enactments that have taken place, and thus it is the cardiologist that 
provides Simon with the final translation of his chest pain and heart. And, in an attempt 
to maintain symptom-cause coherence, two tactics were employed by the cardiologist: 
postulating another cause for the pain, and suggesting that the treadmill test generated an 
inadequate picture of the heart. As a consequence, only a tentative diagnosis was made.  
Simon was told that his heart was probably healthy, but because this could not be 
guaranteed, he would have to carefully monitor his bodily sensations. His heart is 
consequently enacted as something indefinite; something that escapes being endowed 
with a final, conclusive, bounded form.  While it is most likely linked to anxiety, it retains 
a tentative association with arterial narrowings and blockages, and for this reason, it 
becomes intelligible in terms of risk and as a source for self-surveillance and self-
management.   
To summarise, after having a GP consultation, enduring a treadmill stress test at 
a specialist centre, and then consulting with a highly trained cardiologist, the health of 
Simon’s heart and the cause of his chest pain is still not known for certain. After 
mobilising a great deal of resources and specialist assistance, and the financial 
 102 
expenditure this entails, the state of Simon’s heart cannot be guaranteed. It would be 
misleading to claim that nothing has been achieved, however. After all, as we have seen, 
both the GP and the cardiologist postulated anxiety as the likely cause, and the treadmill 
test, although not infallible, did not detect any heart troubles. The result of these medical 
practices is, rather than a firm diagnosis, a greater degree of assurance. There is, for the 
cardiologist and possibly Simon, more proof that that heart is healthy: there is no 
certainty, just a movement towards one possible explanation.     
I suggest that a great deal of medicine operates like this.  Rather than dealing with 
definite, well-bounded objects and the certainties that these would entail, it may be that 
medical professionals are dealing more with entities that escape a final, conclusive 
enactment. If this is so (and again, more empirical research is needed to determine this), 
then the work of medical professionals is not simply a process of uncovering supposed 
truths within and about the body; it is not a matter of an unprejudiced medical gaze 
revealing the true forms of body and disease. Rather, it is a matter of determining 
probabilities and managing risk. Uncertainty is always present: a likely cause for an illness 
may be foregrounded, but other potential causes are seldom eliminated.  Accounts are 
produced, entities are enacted, and decisions are made, but medical practices do not 
necessarily generate a clear and definitive order of things.  
 It is worth asking, as a brief thought experiment, what would have provided the 
cardiologist and Simon with a more definitive diagnosis. There are, as the cardiologist 
stated, other tests that can be done to determine if the heart is the cause of Simon’s pain. 
One such test is the coronary angiogram. X-ray images of the arteries of the heart are 
taken, so that any blockages or narrowings are rendered visible. To do this, however, a 
radio-opaque dye must be released into the patient, creating an X-ray image of shadows 
representing the normally transparent heart arteries. A specialist inserts a catheter into a 
patient and gently guides it, through the arterial system, to the opening of the coronary 
artery. The dye is then released directly into the heart, and the X-ray images are taken 
(Julian et. al. 1998). The procedure is considered to be more accurate than the treadmill 
stress test, and can potentially determine the exact location of any narrowings within the 
heart. But unlike the treadmill stress test, it is invasive. Although uncommon, the radio-
opaque dye can cause kidney damage or an allergic reaction. It is also much more 
expensive: surgical instruments and staff need to be employed, and the necessary agents 
are not cheap.  
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In cardiac cases such as Simon, there is something of a trade-off between 
certainty and cost: by utilising more tests, a more accurate diagnosis may be possible, but 
this comes at significant cost and increased risk. The treadmill stress test is less accurate, 
but as the GP stated, it is “a cheap and easy test to do”. It is non-invasive, extremely low-
risk, and comparatively inexpensive, and for this reason, it is the “basic screening test”. 
Here, then, is another set of concerns for medical professionals. There may be a range of 
possible tests that can be utilised to determine the cause of an illness, but many require 
expensive, highly specialised equipment, the skills and time of a trained technician, and in 
some cases, opening-up the body of the patient. For these reasons, it is simply not 
feasible for a GP or specialist to enrol as many tests as possible in order to achieve the 
most accurate diagnosis. Choices have to be made, and a degree of certainty may have to 
be sacrificed. In the interests of both the patient’s well-being and financial restrictions, 
some diagnostic procedures will have to be chosen over others. In our case, the 
cardiologist appears to be comfortable with the degree of accuracy achieved by the 
treadmill test. Despite the persistent uncertainty, he makes no recommendation for 
further testing, and instead instructs the patient to monitor his symptoms. Thus, while 
other tests may bring about the enactment of a more definite, well-bounded heart, such 
certainty is not always necessary, or not always possible.  
 
 
Here we have witnessed what Foucault would refer to as relations that constitute power 
(1998: 92-93). In each of the three interactions, we have seen how it is that relations 
between various elements are brought about and how these relations produce intelligible 
entities. We have seen how certain actors initiate the assembling of elements, and we 
have seen how other actors are endowed with form by these practices. The medical 
practices we have been following have been both productive and repressive. They are 
productive in that they produce the entities that become the basis for further action. 
They provide an intelligibility that allows us to talk about, manage, and rationalise things: 
Simon’s chest pain, the health of his heart, Simon as a self-responsible individual. These 
medical practices are restrictive in that by bringing certain elements into an account, 
many other potential elements are excluded or ignored.  In the process of making an 
object intelligible, a myriad of other potential forms are inhibited. We have seen that in 
the treadmill stress test, there was no allowance for Simon to influence the construction 
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of the reality of his own heart. Here, then, we have examples of power as both 
productive and restrictive.  
We have also seen how this power, as Foucault suggests (1998: 94), is diffuse. 
Rather than being possessed by some sort of dominating elite, it is exercised from 
innumerable points: in each of the interactions we studied, the actors initiating the 
assembly of entities varied. Spokes-agents and actors changed as entities assembled and 
reassembled. There is considerable fluctuation in medical practices: in some cases the 
patient is a principal actor in producing accounts, and in other cases they are excluded. 
We have also glimpsed some instances of durability: the treadmill stress test involved 
highly trained staff and fixed instrumentation and Simon was therefore placed in a 
highly-ordered, controlled environment. To use Tarde’s concept (1893), the way in which 
monadic complexity is being translated into an intelligible account is set by the durable 
nature of the technology and training of the medical professionals. I have also suggested 
that durability is provided via the institutionalised stipulation that the cardiologist, as a 
specialist, is permitted to coordinate alternative accounts. So although a diagnostic test-
based account, such as that produced by the treadmill stress test, may not necessarily be 
prioritised over the account produced by a patient, it is only the medical specialist who 
can rank and sort these accounts with any legitimacy.  
We have also exposed the operations of biopower (Foucault 1998: 143). We have 
seen how medical practices in the consultation room can come to shape the everyday 
behaviour of individuals by encouraging them to self-monitor and self-manage 
themselves according to conceptions of “healthy living”. In our examples, the three 
interactions provided a somatic awareness; and understanding of chest pain and the heart 
that could then become the basis for style of life aimed at maximising health. If Simon 
follows the advice he has been given, then he will be governing himself according to the 
cardiologist’s understanding of healthy cardiac living. Medical knowledge therefore lends 
itself to self-governance. A particular subjectivity is being encouraged where individuals 
understand themselves in terms of material, somatic elements, while being persuaded to 
actively manage their own health and well-being via the mediation of a medical authority. 
 
 
So now that we have exposed the relations that constitute power, described how 
accounts are produced and sorted, and noted how entities become intelligible, where do 
we go from here?  Is there any utility to the Actor-network theory we have adopted? To 
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put the question succinctly: is there any point to this, outside of providing our own 
descriptive account of medicine? Can we contribute to a political project aimed at 
eliminating the conditions of domination, which has been the impetus of sociology since 
its inception? My answer is yes, we can. By gaining a knowledge of how others go about 
constructing reality, discerning facts from non-facts, and how some accounts become 
more “objective” than others, we will be well-placed to counteract those situations where 
domination or repression can occur. Such situations may occur when one account is said 
to represent reality and all other accounts are dismissed, or when a patient is repeatedly 
muted in the production of accounts of their own body. We saw how instruments can 
produce accounts of the body while not allowing individuals themselves to contribute. If 
such an account was then held up as being factual and objective, and at the expense of 
potential conflicting accounts produced by the patient, then we can see how domination 
may occur, particularly if the resulting translation prevents access to particular courses of 
action. In this sense, then, domination is a matter of being cut-off from contributing to 
the construction of reality; being prevented from defining your own body with any 
“factual” weight, as discussed with Rhodes et al.’s (2002) examples of patients with back 
pain.  
A useful strategy, then, is to highlight and multiply uncertainties. We have seen in 
Simon’s case that uncertainty was part of medical practices and did not seem to be 
problematic.  The cardiologist appeared to exercise the belief that generating an exact 
picture of cardiac health is difficult, and thus he treated the treadmill stress test as being 
fallible. Indeed, as Lloyd points out, if you follow the experts at work, you will find that 
medicine, like science, is not full of absolute answers. Rather, it is characterised by 
debate, ambiguity, controversies and uncertainties (Lloyd 2000: 158). Even when 
employing instrumentation and undergoing diagnostic tests, objects, as we have seen 
with Simon’s heart, can escape being endowed with a definitive, absolute form. This 
provides a margin for other explanations, other accounts, and thus other actors to 
appear. The cardiologist’s doubt about the treadmill stress test, along with the enactment 
linking his chest pain to anxiety, meant that Simon’s account of his pain did not have to 
be discarded or ignored: the multiplicity of accounts and the resulting uncertainty 
enabled Simon to define parts of his own body with some legitimacy. Simon, then, has 
not been excluded from constructing the reality that becomes the basis for further 
actions concerning his body. If indeed uncertainty and ambiguity is common to medical 
practice, and if such uncertainty provides some room for alternative accounts, 
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particularly those of patients, then the sociologist is well-placed to challenge those 
situations where certainty is being claimed, particularly if a patient’s account has been 
elided. This would require uncovering those practices being employed to prevent the 
possibility of any controversy; in particular, noting which actors are involved in making a 
translation durable enough so that any other accounts are discarded.  
In effect, the sociologist is seeking to challenge domination by preventing the 
definitive culling of elements from accounts and thus encouraging the persistence of 
numerous associations. Obviously, there are times when a definitive diagnosis has 
occurred in medicine and it is not problematic for those concerned.  The diagnosis of a 
bacterial infection, for instance, is a likely example where both the medical professional 
and the patient are pleased with the resulting certainty.  But, in situations where a 
definitive translation is causing considerable distress (and here I have Rhodes et al’s 
chronic back pain sufferers in mind), it may be therapeutic to challenge the reality that is 
being claimed, open-up the uncertainties, and therefore provide a margin for the patient’s 
accounts. The task, then, is to insure the patient and their body is sufficiently 
interconnected to allow room for multiple enactments to occur. In this way, the patient 
retains the ability to define and delimit their body and themselves according to a wider 
range of elements, not just those that inhabit the diagnostics lab or the specialist clinic. In 
a sense we are promoting the same sort of interconnectivity as Haraway in her “Cyborg 
Manifesto” (1991). Freedom can be found in the confusion that results in the lack of 
definitiveness. Uncertainty, vagueness, and the permeability of boundaries results in a 
profusion of spaces for making identities; a resource for the self-construction of one’s 
body and one’s body-politic (Haraway 1991: 151). There is, then, a freedom to be 
garnered from uncertainty; a freedom from being dominated by a single viewpoint, a 
viewpoint that is the product of a single, definitive construction of reality, or a misguided 
belief in a single, well-bounded order of things.   
 
I have had two objectives in undertaking this project. The first has been to argue in 
favour of an Actor-Network theory-based approach to studying medical practices. There 
is, I have argued, much to be gained from forfeiting the assumptions that characterise 
more traditional sociological approaches. By jettisoning any a priori divisions between 
social and non-social elements, discarding the macro/micro distinction, and accepting 
that any element may become an actor, we can determine how it is that medical practices 
produce intelligibility and thus construct patients, bodies, and subjectivities. 
 107 
Consequently, I have attempted to demonstrate that rather their being an absolute order 
of things, there is a constant assembling and reassembling; a constant ordering of things.  
My second objective, then, has been to argue that with a knowledge of how medical 
practices order the world, sociologists are well-situated to counteract situations where 
domination may occur. By exposing the relations that constitute power, and armed with 
a knowledge that uncertainty and ambiguity is often common and non-problematic in 
medicine, we can promote multiplicity and thus provide a margin for alternative 
enactments and accounts to have an influence in the ordering of the world. Like all 
projects, the need for more empirical research has been highlighted. We have followed 
one patient through primary and secondary care. For my arguments to carry more 
weight, it would be necessary to follow more patients: men and women, in both primary 
and secondary care, and in different specialist areas.  
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